D.C. District Court Holds Plaintiff to a Demanding Standard and Denies Class Certification Based on Inability to Establish Common Damages

The plaintiff filed a class action suit in the District Court of the District of Columbia against the defendant, Whole Foods Market, Inc. (Whole Foods), alleging that Whole Foods had violated antitrust laws by purchasing one of its competitors, Wild Oats Markets. The class certification hearing focused on whether the plaintiff could demonstrate that the putative class of consumers of natural and organic foods had been adversely affected by the merger and their alleged damages could be proven with evidence common to the class. The plaintiff offered an expert witness, who proposed to create an econometric model to demonstrate that the merger caused prices of Whole Foods products to rise. Whole Foods disputed the proposed model, offering its own expert.

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New York District Court Applies a More Relaxed Standard and Certifies Two Classes in an Antitrust Class Action

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York against Chinese manufacturers (the defendants) of vitamin C, alleging that the defendants violated antitrust laws by engaging in a cartel to fix prices and limit the output of vitamin C. In this long- pending litigation, class certification motions were addressed nearly seven years after the litigation was commenced. The plaintiffs moved to certify two classes, one that sought damages from the defendants, and another that sought injunctive relief. The defendants challenged the creation of both classes on a number of different grounds.

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Delaware Follows "Reasonable Conceivability" Standard for Motions to Dismiss

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale.

The Delaware Supreme Court recently held that a “reasonable conceivability” rather than a “plausibility” standard governs motions to dismiss in state court proceedings. The Court held that notwithstanding the (federal) “plausibility” standard adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in two recent decisions, the governing pleading standard in Delaware to survive a motion to dismiss, “reasonable conceivability,” was a “minimal” one. The Delaware Supreme Court explained that the federal “plausibility” standard “invites judges to determin[e] whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief and draw on . . . judicial experience and common sense” whereas, under the less stringent “reasonable conceivability” standard, a complaint cannot be dismissed unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances. The Delaware Supreme Court re-emphasized that until it decides otherwise, or a change is duly effected through the Civil Rules process, the governing pleading standard in Delaware to survive a motion to dismiss will remain the “reasonable conceivability” standard.

Cambium Ltd. v. Trilantic Capital Partners, No. 363, 2011 (Del. Supr. Jan. 20, 2011).

Court Dismisses Securities Fraud Claim for Failure to Allege Economic Loss

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale.

Notwithstanding a high level corporate officer’s allegedly duplicitous conduct, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania recently dismissed a securities fraud claim based on the plaintiff’s failure to allege economic loss attributable to the alleged misrepresentation of the defendant. The plaintiff, a corporation that sells graphite, brought this action against its former president, alleging, among other things, that the defendant had violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had made material misrepresentations in his nondisclosure, noncompetition and nonsolicitation agreements, which had induced the plaintiff to issue to the defendant shares of common stock as a part of an employee stock purchase agreement. The defendant operated the company for several years without disclosing that he had, all the while, not actually resigned from his former employer, a competitor of plaintiff’s in the graphite sales industry. The Court classified this 10(b) claim as a “non-typical” one, i.e., one where the allegations do not involve the price of a publicly-traded security. The Court agreed with the defendant that the plaintiff had failed to allege that it had suffered any economic loss, and by extension, loss causation, i.e., economic loss attributable to the alleged misrepresentation of the defendant, both of which are necessary to state a claim for securities fraud. As such, the court dismissed the securities fraud claim.

Specialty Graphite Services, Inc. v. Chiodo, No. 2:11-cv-1438 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2012).

District Court Finds That Complaint Adequately Alleged Existence and Breach of an Oral Partnership Agreement

Co-authored by Jason F. Clouser.

Plaintiff Scott McNamara, M.D. brought an action against defendants Catherine Picken, M.D. and Washington ENT Group, PLLC (WENT) for an accounting, conversion, breach of contract, interference with business relations, and defamation.

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Sixth Circuit Confirms That Burden-Shifting Test Applies to FMLA Interference Claim

Co-authored by Jason F. Clouser.

Plaintiff Gwendolyn Donald, a former restaurant assistant manager, filed a suit against an Arby’s franchise owner claiming that the franchise terminated her employment in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Michigan’s Persons With Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCR). The district court granted summary judgment for defendant Sybra, Inc. (Sybra).

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Adverse Domination Statute of Limitations Doctrine Limited

Co-authored by Dean N. Razavi.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit last week held that the Illinois doctrine of adverse domination for tolling the statute of limitations on an action does not apply where a defendant was not a co-conspirator of a wrong-doing officer or director.

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Indemnification Extended to Officer's Post-Employment Actions

Co-authored by Dean N. Razavi.

The Delaware Chancery Court granted indemnification to an officer who defended claims against him arising from representations he allegedly made before a merger, and for related conduct that occurred after that merger.

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Delaware Standing Requirements Do Not Apply to Derivative Suit Involving Spanish Corporation's Delaware Subsidiary

The plaintiff, Sagarra Inversiones, S.L. (Sagarra), the minority shareholder in Corporación Uniland S.A. (Uniland), a Spanish Corporation, sought to rescind the sale to Uniland of Giant Cement Holdings, Inc. (Giant), a company controlled by the defendant, Cementos Portland Valderrivas (CPV), the majority shareholder of Uniland. Sagarra asserted that the price paid for Giant was inflated and that CPV caused Uniland to acquire Giant solely to further its own interests, in breach of its fiduciary duties to Uniland. To challenge the sale, Sagarra brought a derivative action in Delaware on behalf of Uniland Acquisition Corp. (UAC), a Delaware subsidiary of Uniland that was created to facilitate the sale. The Delaware Court of Chancery held that Sagarra did not have standing to challenge the sale because it had not satisfied the demand requirements of Spanish law.

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Federal District Court Stays State Court Discovery Pursuant To SLUSA

The plaintiff filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, alleging that the defendants omitted material facts from a proxy statement, breaching their fiduciary duties and violating the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. In the District Court, defendants moved to stay discovery in three related state court proceedings until a motion to dismiss the federal suit was resolved. The defendants argued that the Court should exercise its power under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act, which permits a district court to stay discovery proceedings in state court in aid of the district court’s jurisdiction.

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Pennsylvania District Court Denies Motion to Dismiss and for a More Definite Statement

Co-authored by Jason F. Clouser

Plaintiff Kimberton Healthcare Consulting, Inc. d/b/a DialysisPPO (DPPO), a provider of benefits consulting services, brought an action alleging breach of contract, violation of the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade Secrets Act (PUTSA) and various tort claims against Primary Physiciancare, Inc. (PPC), a privately held medical management company.

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SEC Alleges Violations of Securities Exchange Act Against Manufacturer and Former CEO

Co-authored by Jason F. Clouser

On December 12, the Securities and Exchange Commission charged a subsidiary of GlaxoSmithKline with violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder in connection with the company’s stock buybacks between November 2006 and April 2009.

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Seventh Circuit Gives Guidance on McCaskill-Bond Amendment to Federal Aviation Act

Co-authored by Dean N. Razavi.

The McCaskill-Bond Amendment to the Federal Aviation Act provides that a merger of air carriers requires the new entity to merge the seniority lists of the two carriers’ employees. Republic Airways acquired Midwest Airlines, and thereafter the Teamsters Union, which represented the flight attendants at Republic’s older carriers, refused to integrate the seniority lists for flight attendants and placed Midwest’s flight attendants at the bottom of the seniority roster. A group of Midwest flight attendants challenged the action, asserting that it violated the amendment. The Teamsters argued that, at the time of acquisition, Midwest was on the verge of bankruptcy, that Republic abandoned Midwest’s regulatory certificate, and therefore Midwest was not an “air carrier” for the purpose of the amendment. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin characterized the transaction as merely Republic’s acquisition of some of Midwest’s assets, but not the acquisition of an air carrier for the purposes of the amendment, thus holding that integration of seniority lists was not required.

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Ninth Circuit Revisits Merck Rules on Securities Fraud Limitations Period

Co-authored by Dean N. Razavi.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court’s holding that a securities fraud claim was time-barred, noting that the 2010 Supreme Court case Merck & Co. v. Reynolds had rejected “inquiry notice” as the bright-line test for the limitations period. The plaintiff alleged that he had sold his interest in Alchemix Corporation based on misrepresentations as to ongoing negotiations between Alchemix, AFG investment group, and Western Oil Sands. Alchemix countered that, in 2002, it sent the plaintiff a letter noting that negotiations with AFG had terminated, putting the plaintiff on inquiry notice to further investigate the circumstances surrounding the negotiations. Because the limitations period is the earliest of five years or two years after the discovery of facts constituting the violation, the district court held that receipt of the letter more than two years before the suit was filed barred litigation.

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Seventh Circuit Vacates Class Certification Based on Counsel Misconduct

Co-authored by Jason F. Clouser.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision to grant class certification based on the misconduct of plaintiff’s counsel.

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Civil RICO Case Fails In Absence of Specific Fraud Allegations

Co-authored by Jason F. Clouser.

A Colorado federal district court dismissed RICO claims in a case involving a property owner and a homeowners’ association, finding that the plaintiffs failed to plead specific instances of fraud necessary to sustain the claims.

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Court Adopts Model Order on E-Discovery in Patent Cases for Litigation Between Competitors

Co-authored by Dean N. Razavi.

In a patent infringement suit between two competing technology firms, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California adopted the “Model Order on E-Discovery in Patent Cases” recently promulgated by a subcommittee of the Advisory Council of the Federal Circuit.

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Court of Chancery Analyzes Class Conflicts for Certification

Co-authored by Dean N. Razavi.

The Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion to certify a class of investor plaintiffs in a limited liability company, dismissing a claim raised by the defendant manager that there was a conflict of interest among class members.

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Court Addresses Appropriate Procedure for Lead Plaintiff Appointment

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York recently addressed the question of how to designate a lead plaintiff in a class action brought under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) where the original named plaintiff withdraws.

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District Court Grants Motion to Dismiss Fraud Claim Against Corporate Officers

Co-authored by Jason Clouser.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted a motion to dismiss a fraud claim against two corporate officers in a case arising out of a failed business relationship between two companies that sell products used in fundraising efforts.

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Fourth Circuit Holds That Contractual Language Does Not Compel Court to Grant Equitable Relief

Co-authored by Jason Clouser.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction motion by Bethesda Softworks, LLC (Bethesda), finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by looking to factors outside of the agreement between the parties in ruling on the motion.

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New Jersey District Court Dismisses Securities Fraud Action With Prejudice

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

The plaintiff, a former officer of Alfacell Corporation (Alfacell), a biopharmaceutical company engaged in the development of cancer therapies, brought an action against his former employer, alleging violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5. The plaintiff, who had been granted stock options in Alfacell, alleged, inter alia, that Alfacell had knowingly and/or recklessly disseminated false and misleading information concerning the completion date of a clinical trial for an experimental new cancer treatment. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissed the plaintiff’s claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 with prejudice. After considering Alfacell’s alleged statements in the context of the “the total mix of information available to investors,” the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the alleged statements and omissions constituted material misrepresentations. The court reasoned that, even assuming the statements at issue were false, a reasonable investor, viewing all of the information made available by Alfacell, would not have considered Alfacell’s statements as “having significantly altered the total mix of information available” to the investing public.

Love v. Alfacell Corp., No. 09-5199 (MLC), 2011 WL 4915874 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2011)
 

PA District Court Deems "Piercing the Corporate Veil" to be Independent Cause of Action

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

The plaintiff filed an action alleging sexual harassment and retaliation by the defendants, but the only claim asserted against defendant, Pressley Ridge Foundation (the Foundation), was a claim for “piercing the corporate veil.” This claim did not plead a separate cause of action, but rather, sought to pierce the corporate veil in order to assess liability against the Foundation for the alleged wrongful acts of the other two defendants. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania held that piercing the corporate veil was a valid, independent cause of action. However, the Court granted the Foundation’s motion to dismiss the complaint, finding that the plaintiff’s mere recitation of the elements of a veil-piercing claim was insufficient and that such a claim needed to be supported by specific factual averments rather than mere legal conclusions.

Patroski v. Ridge, No. 2:11-cv-1065, 2011 WL 4955274 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2011)
 

Pennsylvania District Court Holds Swiss Corporation is Not Alter Ego of US Corporation

The plaintiff, a corporation seeking to recover outstanding debts incurred by TCI Trans Commodities A.G. (TCI Switzerland), a bankrupt Swiss entity, sued Trans Commodities, Inc. (TCINY), a New York corporation, to collect the debt. The plaintiff alleged that TCINY and TCI Switzerland were so intertwined or interrelated as to be “alter egos” or a “single entity,” and thus TCINY was liable for TCI Switzerland’s debt to the plaintiff.

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California District Court Dismisses Securities Fraud Class Action Suit

Plaintiff-investors commenced a class action suit alleging a violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 on behalf of all persons who purchased shares of defendant NVIDIA’s stock during a 9-month period. The plaintiff alleged that NVIDIA and its employees had misrepresented or omitted material facts related to manufacturing defects in its computer processors, and that they were damaged when the NVIDIA stock price dropped once the extent of the defects became known. The U.S District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs’ action because the complaint failed sufficiently to plead scienter as required for securities fraud.

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FINRA May Not Bring Civil Actions to Collect Disciplinary Fines

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority lacks the authority to bring court actions to collect disciplinary fines it has imposed on its members.

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Brokerage Firm's Sale of Account Holder's Securities Not a Securities Violation

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held last week that a brokerage firm’s sale of an account holder’s securities for failure to meet margins calls was proper, notwithstanding the account holder’s claims that his contract with the firm was a forgery.

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Fraudulent Statements That Maintain Inflated Price Can Support Securities Fraud Claims

Authored by Jason Clouser.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated a District Court’s entry of summary judgment on plaintiff shareholders’ claims against an internet commerce company, finding that the defendants could be held liable for knowingly reinforcing false information and thereby preventing already existing stock price inflation from dissipating.

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Provision of Credit Card Receipt Is Not A "Publication" That Triggers Duty To Defend

Authored by Jason Clouser.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a District Court’s grant of summary judgment to an insurer, agreeing that the alleged violations of the Fair and Accurate Credit Card Transaction Act (FACTA) did not constitute a “publication” under the insurance policy in question and, therefore, did not trigger a duty to defend.

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Shareholder Advisory Vote Constitutes Evidence of Board's Breach of Duty of Loyalty

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio declined to dismiss a complaint brought by shareholders of Cincinnati Bell, a publicly-traded company, suing the company’s directors for breach of the duty of loyalty. The shareholder derivative suit was based on the directors’ grant of $4 million in bonuses on top of $4.5 million in salary and other compensation to the chief executive officer in the same year that Cincinnati Bell had incurred significant declines in net income, earnings per share, share price and a negative annual shareholder return. Ordinarily, courts will not inquire into board decisions under the business judgment rule, but the court found that the presumption of this rule had been rebutted by the plaintiffs’ allegations of evidentiary facts demonstrating that Cincinnati Bell’s board members did not act in the best interests of the company or its shareholders. Included among these evidentiary facts was the Cincinnati Bell board’s unanimous approval of the executive compensation at issue, notwithstanding an advisory vote, required under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act, in which 66% of voting shareholders voted against such compensation.

NECA-IBEW Pension Fund ex rel. Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Cox, No. 1:11-cv-451 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2011).
 

Misrepresentations Regarding Financing of Buy-Out of LLC Interest Not a 10b-5 Violation

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment dismissing claims for, inter alia, alleged violations of federal securities laws and conspiracy to defraud brought by a member of a limited liability company (LLC) and its owners against the defendant who had financed the buy-out of the member’s one-half interest in the LLC at issue. Defendant, Shelby Peeples, falsely stated that he had no involvement in the buy-out of member DynaVision Group, LLC’s, interest in Signature Hospitality Carpets, LLC, when, in fact, Peeples had financed the buy-out. The circuit court found that Peeples’ misrepresentation regarding his (lack of) involvement in the buy-out did not play a causative role in DynaVision’s decision to sell its interest in the LLC, and thus did not rise to a level of fraud actionable under Rule 10b-5. Specifically, the circuit court found that because DynaVision lacked the expertise necessary to operate Signature, could not have persuaded the individual members of the LLC to stay on board, and was forced to choose between cashing out and total ownership (based on a buy-sell provision in Signature’s operating agreement), DynaVision would be unable to prove the reliance element of a 10b-5 claim.

Ledford v. Peeples, No. 06-10715, 2011 WL 4424448 (11th Cir. Sept. 23, 2011).
 

Ninth Circuit Allows Discharge of Debt Related to Securities Law Violation

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has found that debts relating to a securities law violation could be discharged in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding if the debtor himself was not responsible for violating federal securities laws.

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Delaware Chancery Court Enjoins Texas Lawsuit Based on Forum Selection Clause

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

The Delaware Chancery Court enjoined a lawsuit pending in Texas state court based on a forum selection clause providing for exclusive jurisdiction in Delaware over claims arising out of the parties’ agreements.

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Sixth Circuit Finds That Mutual Fund Class Action Is Preempted By SLUSA

Shareholders in three mutual funds issued by Morgan Keegan Select Fund, Inc. (the Funds) filed a state court class action alleging that the Funds’ officers, directors, and affiliates took unjustified risks in allocating the Funds’ assets and then concealed those risks from shareholders, causing the shareholders to retain their shares while the shares dropped in value. The complaint asserted only state law causes of action. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee ruled that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) precluded the plaintiffs’ class action and dismissed their claims with prejudice.

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Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Affirms Dismissal of Whistleblower Retaliation Suit

The plaintiff, a former employee of Stein Mart, Inc., brought claims alleging that Stein Mart wrongfully dismissed her in violation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the Florida Whistleblower Act. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of Stein Mart, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on appeal.

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Third Circuit Affirms District Court's Dismissal of Securities Fraud Class Action for Failure to Plead Scienter

Co-authored by Elizabeth Langdale

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant of defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims against corporate defendants and individual officers and directors of Horizon Lines, Inc. for securities fraud arising out of price fixing under the heightened pleading standard in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (the PSLRA). Highlighting that the PSLRA places a weighty burden on plaintiffs, the Third Circuit affirmed that plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to raise a strong inference of scienter as to the senior executives of Horizon. The Third Circuit further held that in pleading scienter as to the corporation, one still needed to look to the state of mind of the individual corporate officials who made the statements at issue, as opposed to the collective knowledge of all the corporation’s employees. Because there was no individual at Horizon who made actionable statements with scienter, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s determination that the plaintiff had not pled scienter against the corporation.

City of Roseville Employees’ Retirement System v. Horizon Lines, Inc., Nos. 10-2788 and 10-3815 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 2011).
 

Defendants' Ineffective Document Review Procedure Results in Finding of Waiver

Co-authored by Elizabeth Langdale

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that defendants, Village of Park Forest and individual defendants (collectively, the Village), waived privilege as to inadvertently produced documents where they failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent the disclosure of privileged material and subsequently failed to correct their error in a timely manner. Citing defendants’ lack of an adequate explanation of their review process, their failure to check the production before sending it to the plaintiffs and their ultimate failure to identify and withhold from production any of the 159 documents on their privilege log, the court determined that the steps taken to prevent disclosure were not reasonable. Further, the Court found no unfairness in allowing the plaintiffs to access the privileged documents and ultimately held the Village responsible for its failure to take reasonable care to safeguard the privilege and to rectify the error once it occurred.

Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC v. Village of Park Forest, et al., Nos. 08 C 1225, 08 C-0869, 08-C-4303 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2011).
 

Creditors of Insolvent Limited Liability Companies Cannot Sue Derivatively

Co-authored by Jason Clouser

The Supreme Court of Delaware recently held that creditors of insolvent Delaware limited liability companies (LLCs) lack standing to bring derivative suits on behalf of the LLCs.

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Seventh Circuit Cuts Damages Award Due to Lack of Evidence of Lost Profits

Co-authored by Jason Clouser

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dramatically reduced damages awarded to a defunct internet marketing company, finding that the company squandered its opportunity to provide a reasonable estimate of the harm it suffered as a result of the defendant’s conduct.

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Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act is Not a Jurisdictional Bar to Antitrust Suit

Co-authored by: Dean M. Razavi

In Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overturned its prior decisions in Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines Inc. and Carpet Group Int’l v. Oriental Rug Importers Ass’n, and held that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (the “FTAIA”) sets forth substantive merits requirements for private antitrust claims rather than a jurisdictional threshold to antitrust suits brought in connection with foreign commerce and international trade.

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Post-Judgment Interest Rate Applies When Judgment is "Meaningfully Ascertained"

Co-authored by: Dean M. Razavi

In NML Capital Ltd v. The Republic of Argentina, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Argentina was liable for prejudgment contract interest only through the date on which the District Court first determined liability in a final judgment, and not through to a later date on which that judgment was partially modified as a result of the appeals process.

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Second Circuit Affirms Madoff Trustee's Net Equity Calculation

Co-authored by: Brian Schmidt

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found in favor of the trustee (the Trustee) presiding over the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BMIS), affirming the Trustee’s calculation of “net equity” in the BMIS liquidation. The Trustee calculates net equity to determine the value of claims submitted by victims of Madoff’s massive fraud.

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Court Finds Arbitration Clauses Cell Phone Contracts do not Apply to Collection Agency

Customers who had signed cell phone contracts with Verizon and AT&T, brought a class action against the collection agency that the phone companies hired to collect unpaid fees and charges. The complaint alleged that the agency, Collecto, Inc., violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and New York’s consumer protection statute and committed common law fraud by seeking payment of collection costs in addition to the unpaid fees owed to phone companies. Collecto moved to compel the plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims, arguing that the mandatory arbitration clauses in the agreements between the plaintiffs and the phone companies should also apply to Collecto.

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Delaware Court Upholds Transfer of Voting Interests to an Existing LLC Member

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

The Delaware Court of Chancery has upheld the assignment of a Delaware limited liability company membership interest, including the voting rights associated with that interest, to an existing member of the LLC. Omniglow LLC had three members: (i) plaintiff Achaian, Inc., which owned 20% of Omniglow; (ii) defendant Leemon Family LLC, which owned 50% of Omniglow; and (iii) Randye M. Holland, who had owned a 30% membership interest in Omniglow. In January 2010, Holland purported to transfer and assign its entire 30% interest to Achaian. Achaian then filed suit seeking an order of dissolution of Omniglow, asserting that it and Leemon were deadlocked with respect to the management of the company. Leemon opposed the motion, arguing, among other things, that Holland could not assign his voting rights in the LLC without Leemon’s consent.

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Delaware Chancery Court Orders Hedge Fund to Return $40 Million Seed Investment

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

An investment fund (the Lerner Fund) controlled by Randy Lerner, the owner of the Cleveland Browns, recently obtained a court order for the return of the remainder of its $40 million seed investment in a hedge fund (the Paige Fund) managed by Paige Capital Management LLC. After the expiration of the three year lock-up period, the Lerner Fund sought to redeem its full investment. The Paige Fund and its managers (the Paiges) refused to allow the full redemption and instead attempted to apply a “gate” provision in the Paige Fund’s partnership agreement that limited redemptions if they would cause more than 20% of the fund’s assets to be withdrawn. The Lerner Fund was the only investor in the fund other than a principal of the Paiges, and its redemption request, if honored, would have resulted in the withdrawal of 99.9% of the Paige Fund’s assets.

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Revisions of Earnings Forecasts Fail to Support Securities Fraud Claims

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

A federal court in Texas dismissed a purported securities fraud class action against a clothing retailer because the claims (a) were based on deficient confidential witness statements and (b) failed to demonstrate that the company’s inaccurate earnings projections were made with knowledge of falsity.

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Lender's Good Faith Scuttles Breach of Contract Claim

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment dismissal of a breach of contract claim asserted by a medical services company because the totality of the circumstances demonstrated that the lender complied with the loan agreement by acting in good faith when it declared default.

 

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Court Vacates SEC Shareholder Nomination Rule

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sharply criticized the Securities and Exchange Commission and vacated Exchange Act Rule 14a-11, which permitted certain shareholders of public companies to nominate candidates for the board of directors outside a company's normal nomination process. As noted in last week's edition of the Corporate and Financial Weekly Digest, the court held that the SEC was "arbitrary and capricious" in promulgating Rule 14a-11 and thus violated the Administrative Procedure Act in failing to adequately consider the Rule's effect upon efficiency, competition and capital formation.

 

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Court Finds Martin Act Does Not Preempt Non-Fraud Tort Claims

Plaintiffs brought claim in New York federal court for common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty against Defendant ThinkStrategy Capital Management, LLC (“ThinkStrategy”), a “fund of funds” in which plaintiffs invested. Plaintiffs alleged that ThinkStrategy had represented that it would conduct adequate due diligence on its managers, but failed to do so when it placed assets with a manager that was later found to be engaged in fraud. ThinkStrategy moved for summary judgment on all of Schwarz’s claims.

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Generic Drug "Sham" Litigation Claim Accrues on Date of Competitor Drug Approval

Medical Mutual of Ohio, Inc. (“MMOH”), a medical insurer, brought an antitrust class action on behalf of similarly situated indirect purchasers of a constipation drug produced by Braintree Laboratories (“Braintree”) in Delaware federal court. The class action claim arose from a patent infringement case filed by Braintree against a generic drug maker, Schwartz Pharma, Inc. (“Schwartz”), in 2003. The patent case was dismissed and Schwartz’s generic drug was approved soon after the dismissal. MMOH later asserted that Braintree’s suit against Schwartz was a “sham litigation” designed to extend Braintree’s monopoly over the constipation drug market. Braintree moved to dismiss, arguing that MMOH’s claim was time-barred.

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Rule 10b-5 Applies to Transfers of Foreign Securities That Close in the U.S.

Co-authored by Dean N. Razavi

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently vacated a district court's dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the district court erred in holding that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 did not apply to a sale of shares in a foreign corporation that closed in the United States.

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Alleged Financial Distress Insufficient to Support Grant of Preliminary Injunction

Co-authored by Dean N. Razavi

The Delaware Court of Chancery denied a request for a preliminary injunction, finding that allegations of "financial distress" failed to demonstrate the imminent, irreparable harm required to obtain immediate injunctive relief.

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Investors in Argentine Bonds Entitled to Millions in Additional Interest

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

The New York Court of Appeals held that, under the terms of bond documents requiring biannual interest payments "until the principal…is paid," Argentina was contractually obligated to make biannual interest payments to bondholders even after the bonds' scheduled maturity date in 2005 and after certain bondholders accelerated the maturity date following Argentina's default in 2001. Because the bond documents required interest payments "until the principal…is paid," Argentina's obligation continued until it repaid the principal in full or until its obligation was "merged" into a final judgment.

 

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Facebook Profile Subject to Discovery

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania recently considered whether information contained within a party's Facebook account is properly subject to discovery.

The case arose from a November 2008 car accident that, according to the plaintiff, caused severe injuries limiting his ability to sit, walk, stand, bend, stoop, push, pull and lift. Plaintiff specifically claimed that he could not drive for any period of time and was physically limited with regard to riding his bicycle or motorcycle. In addition, Plaintiff alleged that the accident caused decreased sociability and lack of intimacy.

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Supreme Court Sets High Bar for Class Action Suits

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

The U.S. Supreme Court overturned certification of a class of 1.5 million current and former female employees of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in the largest sex discrimination case in history. In a 5-4 decision, the Court found that plaintiffs had not cleared the "commonality" hurdle for class certification set by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), which requires parties to prove that claims of putative class members share common questions of law and fact.

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Monetary Sanctions Imposed on Counsel and Client for Discovery Violations

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington imposed monetary sanctions on plaintiff Play Visions, Inc. and its counsel for failure to search for documents in a timely fashion, delayed and inadequate document production, false certification that the relevant records were maintained only in paper format, and for counsel's specific failure to adequately understand the client's document retention system or assist in production.

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Supreme Court Creates Bright Line Test Under Rule 10b-5

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

The U.S. Supreme Court has found that a party that assists in the drafting and dissemination of a misleading statement related to the sale of a security—but that is not the legal entity ultimately responsible for the statement—will not be subject to liability for securities fraud under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5.

 

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Absence of "Hard Numbers" Scuttles Securities Fraud Claims

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed securities fraud claims against a dental device maker based on the plaintiffs' failure to allege sufficient "hard numbers" showing that that the defendants knew their public statements were false when made.

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Directors' Bonuses Tied to Sale Rendered Them Interested

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The Delaware Court of Chancery sustained in part the claims of a plaintiff investor challenging a company's sale of its primary asset based upon allegations that the vote of the individual director defendants approving the sale was tainted by bonuses they received tied to that sale.

In December 2005, individual director defendants of nominal defendant Winmill & Co., Inc., a 22% shareholder in Bexil Corporation, a holding company, voted in favor of a transaction by which Bexil would sell its interest in a third company, its primary asset. In April 2006, Bexil's shareholders approved the sale, resulting in pre-tax proceeds to Bexil of approximately $38.5 million. Two of the individual director defendants who had approved the transaction received bonus compensation directly tied to the sale totaling $2.5 million.

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Delaware Has Jurisdiction over Corporation Based on Claims Arising out of Performance of Predecessor's Contracts

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The Superior Court of Delaware recently denied a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that, following a merger, the defendant corporation continued to transact business within Delaware and, in connection with that business, caused injury within the state. As a result, the court determined that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant was proper.

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Department of Labor Panel Adopts Liberal Pleading Standard for SOX Whistleblower Cases

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The U.S. Department of Labor's Administrative Review Board (ARB) adopted a liberal pleading standard for whistleblower retaliation cases under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX).

Two former employees of Parexel International LLC filed whistleblower complaints alleging that Parexel terminated their employment in violation of SOX's anti-retaliation provisions. Both former employees had complained to their superiors after discovering that other company employees were falsifying drug-testing data in violation of Food and Drug Administration rules. Parexel allegedly failed to investigate the falsification, and over the next several months both complainants were allegedly subjected to various forms of retaliation and finally terminated.

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Eleventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Securities Fraud Complaint Against Mortgage Lender

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

Stockholder plaintiffs brought a purported class action against HomeBanc Corporation and certain of its officers and directors alleging that the mortgage and lending company committed securities fraud by improperly concealing numerous purchases of subprime mortgage securities, which allegedly caused substantial losses when the company collapsed during the housing and subprime market crash.

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Federal Circuit Addresses Duty to Preserve

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently reviewed the decisions in Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 225 F.R.D. 135, (D. Del. 2009) (Micron I), and Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 591 F.Supp.2d 1038 (N.D.Cal. 2006) (Hynix I), two cases that analyzed substantially identical facts but reached widely disparate conclusions. In each case, the plaintiff alleged that Rambus, Inc. committed spoliation by destroying potentially relevant documents pursuant to a document destruction policy at two company-sponsored "shred days." In both cases, the question of spoliation turned on the point at which litigation was reasonably foreseeable. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware determined that Rambus had committed spoliation because litigation was reasonably foreseeable prior to the destruction of documents, and issued sanctions against Rambus. Conversely, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California concluded that litigation was not reasonably foreseeable until after certain documents had already been destroyed, and did not sanction Rambus.

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Supreme Court Rules That Whistleblowers Cannot Rely on FOIA Requests in FCA Cases

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

On May 16, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that claims brought by private plaintiffs under the federal False Claims Act (FCA) could not be based on information received from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. In a 5-3 decision that reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court found that FOIA requests qualify as "reports" that trigger the public disclosure bar for qui tam actions under the FCA.

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SEC Requires $5.4 Million Payment in First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

The Securities and Exchange Commission entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) with Tenaris S.A. in the SEC's first-ever use of such agreement to facilitate and reward cooperation with the SEC. When Tenaris, a global manufacturer of steel pipe products, conducted a worldwide internal review of its operations and controls, it discovered that its personnel in Uzbekistan violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) by bribing Uzbekistani government officials to secure an advantage during a bidding process to supply pipelines for transporting natural gas. Tenaris informed the SEC of the violation. The SEC alleged that Tenaris made almost $5 million in profits when it was awarded several contracts as a result of the alleged bribery.

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Whistleblower Must Provide Information to the SEC to State a Retaliation Claim Under Dodd-Frank

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

A New York federal district court recently ruled that, with limited statutorily defined exceptions, a whistleblower asserting private relation claims under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act must allege that the information he provided was reported to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The court held, however, that the Dodd-Frank Act does not require that the whistleblower directly provide the information to the SEC in order to pursue a claim. Rather, all that is required is that the whistleblower allege that he acted jointly in an effort to provide the information concerning the alleged misconduct to the SEC.

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Failure to Issue Written Litigation Hold Did Not Warrant Sanctions

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

A company's failure to implement a written litigation hold and its subsequent failure to produce certain documents responsive to an adversary's discovery request did not require finding the company liable for spoliation of evidence, a New York federal court recently ruled.

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Employment Contract Claims Survive Motion to Dismiss

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York denied defendants' motion to dismiss a complaint alleging that defendants improperly used confidential business information and solicited plaintiffs' employees and customers in contravention of defendants' employment agreements.

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Delaware Chancery Rejects Purported Agreement Extending Court-Ordered Deadline

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The Court of Chancery of Delaware ruled that counsel failed to establish "excusable neglect" when it requested additional time to submit an expert witness report after the deadline for that report—as provided for in the court's previously issued scheduling order—had expired.

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Suit Arising Out of SEC's Failure to Detect Madoff Ponzi Scheme Barred by Sovereign Immunity

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted defendant United States' motion to dismiss a complaint brought by former investors in the investment advisory firm Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BMIS) seeking money damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for losses suffered by plaintiffs in connection with the Ponzi scheme perpetrated by Mr. Madoff and BMIS.

The complaint, derived substantially from the Securities and Exchange Commission Office of Inspector General's 457-page report, entitled "Investigation of Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff's Ponzi Scheme," alleged that the SEC was grossly negligent in carrying out its supervisory duties over the securities industry when it failed to uncover Mr. Madoff's Ponzi scheme despite numerous credible and detailed warnings between 1992 and 2008, and several investigations undertaken by the SEC into Mr. Madoff's and BMIS's trading activity.

In granting the United States' motion, the district court found that plaintiffs' claims were within the FTCA's discretionary function exception and barred by sovereign immunity. The court reasoned that the scope, manner and results of investigative activity undertaken by the SEC is "inherently discretionary and policy-driven," and the complaint failed to sufficiently allege any relevant statutory obligations that required the SEC to undertake a more thorough investigation into BMIS. (Molchatsky v. United States, 2011 WL 1471798 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2011))

Securities Fraud Claim Dismissed for Lack of Standing

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed a claim for securities fraud brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act on the ground that plaintiff lacked standing because he had never purchased or sold the securities in question.

Plaintiff was a doctor who worked at defendant Laboratory Medical Consultants (LMC) for 31 years and retired in 2006. LMC redeemed all of plaintiff's stock in accordance with the parties' 2001 Stockholders' Agreement at that time. Under the 2001 Stockholders' Agreement, a portion of plaintiff's deferred compensation benefits was to be secured by an escrow of plaintiff's stock. Plaintiff alleged that his shares were not properly placed in escrow and defendants conspired to defraud him of the value of his shares during the sale of LMC in 2007.

In granting defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court ruled that under Section 10(b), a claim for securities fraud must be made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Plaintiff did not allege that he was forced to sell his stock or even that it was sold. He alleged harm based on defendant's action in not placing the stock in escrow, or alternatively, based on defendant's placing the stock in escrow and then converting it. In dismissing the complaint, the court held that "the mere involvement of shares of stock does not bring a transaction within [Section 10(b)]." (Slaughter v. Laboratory Medical Consultants, 2011 WL 1486228 (D.Nev. Apr. 19, 2011))

Non-Party Granted Right to Seek to Unseal Court Documents

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

Jepsco, Ltd., a shareholder of Rich Realty Inc. (RRI) requested that all papers filed under seal in an action brought by B.F. Rich Co., Inc. against RRI in the Delaware Chancery Court be opened for review pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 5(g)(6). Jepsco, which was not a party to the action against RRI, asserted a concern that the sealed documents would reveal that RRI sold assets without providing notice to shareholders, or distributing the proceeds of the transaction. RRI objected to Jepsco's request on the basis that Jepsco was not a party to the action and that the text of Rule 5(g)(6) limited this right to parties.

The Court of Chancery did not determine whether Jepsco had standing under Rule 5(g)(6). Instead, it found a clear basis for Jepsco to intervene in the action under Court of Chancery Rule 24, which delineates the circumstances under which a nonparty may intervene in a pending case either as of right or as permitted by the Court. Under Rule 24, a party has standing either where the party can claim an interest in the subject of the litigation or where the applicant's claim and the main action have a common question of fact or law.

The Chancery Court found that Jepsco's motion met both of the standards. Thus, it granted intervention in the underlying litigation for the limited purpose of obtaining access to documents filed under seal. (B.F. Rich Co., Inc. v. Richard E. Gray, Sr. and Rich Realty, Inc., C.A. No. 1896-VCP (Del. Ch. Apr. 8, 2011))

Kansas District Court Rejects "Reverse Alter Ego" Liability Theory

Co-authored by Elizabeth D. Langdale

Plaintiffs entered into a Funding Agreement with defendant Gary Hall that directed the parties to create lending entities to facilitate real estate investments. The Funding Agreement provided that the parties would divide profits received by the lending entities. Defendant Bentley Investments of Nevada LLC was a lending entity Mr. Hall created pursuant to the Funding Agreement. Plaintiffs asserted that defendants failed to advance the profits contractually allocated to them, and thereby breached the Funding Agreement.

Defendant Bentley moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the basis that it failed to plead a breach of contract claim, because Bentley was not a party to the Funding Agreement. Plaintiffs contended that Bentley should be held liable under a "reverse alter ego theory" because it was responsible for Mr. Hall's breaches.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas granted defendants' motion to dismiss, rejecting plaintiffs' argument that Bentley was liable on a reverse alter ego liability theory. Citing Tenth Circuit precedent, the district court noted that absent a clear statement under state law that reverse alter ego liability is appropriate, federal courts should not hold a corporation liable for the acts of an individual. Because Kansas has not clearly adopted reverse alter ego liability, plaintiffs could not predicate a claim on this theory to hold defendant Bentley liable. (Bettis v. Hall, No. 10-2457-JAR, 2011 WL 1430327 (D. Kan. Apr. 14, 2011))

Ninth Circuit Upholds Facebook Settlement

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a lower court's approval of a settlement agreement entered into by The Facebook, Inc. and individual litigants, Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss and Divya Narendra (the Winklevosses), who claimed that the idea for the popular social networking site had been stolen from them. The Winklevosses and their own social networking site sued Facebook and its founder Mark Zuckerberg in Massachusetts and Facebook countersued in California. The California court eventually dismissed the Winklevosses for lack of personal jurisdiction and the parties were ordered to mediate.

During the course of the mediation, the parties signed a handwritten, one-and-a-third page term sheet and settlement agreement. However, after the agreement was signed, a dispute arose during negotiations over the final details, and Facebook moved for an order enforcing the handwritten settlement agreement. The lower court found the agreement enforceable and the Winklevosses appealed. Facebook also sought an order from the lower court requiring the Winklevosses to sign more than 130 pages of documents to effect the settlement, including a stock purchase agreement and other papers, which the court refused to grant.

The Winklevosses argued that the handwritten agreement was unenforceable because it lacked material terms, such as those in the 130 pages of deal documents the parties were negotiating after the agreement was signed. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, distinguishing between material terms that are necessary, "without which there can be no contract," and terms that are "important" and that affect "the value of the bargain." A contract that omits the latter type of terms is "enforceable under California law, so long as the terms it does include are sufficiently definite for a court to determine whether a breach has occurred, order specific performance or award damages." Under this test, the handwritten settlement agreement easily passed muster, as it provided that Facebook would acquire the Winklevosses' site, the Winklevosses would get a cash payment and an interest in Facebook, and that both sides would cease litigation.

Moreover, the handwritten settlement agreement also specified that material terms would be determined later by Facebook "consistent with a stock and cash for stock acquisition." The court read this provision to mean that the parties intended to be bound by the handwritten agreement even though certain material aspects would be finalized later. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the Winklevosses' claim for rescission of the settlement agreement based on purported securities laws violations, finding that they had released all such claims when they signed the settlement agreement. (The Facebook, Inc. v. Pacific Northwest Software, Inc., Nos. 08-16745; 08-16873, 09-15021, 2011 WL 1346951 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011))

Delaware Court Authorizes New Theory of Tortious Interference with Contract

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

Deciding an issue of first impression, the Superior Court of Delaware recently authorized the assertion of claims based on a new theory of tortious interference with contract, but ruled that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under that theory. Allen Family Foods, Inc. operates a poultry processing facility and had contracted with Capital Carbonic Corporation to supply dry ice for the facility. In September 2010, Allen, believing that its contract with Carbonic had been terminated by its terms, entered into a contract with Praxair Distribution, Inc. to supply dry ice. Thereafter, Carbonic sent a letter to Praxair threatening litigation, after which Allen ceased performance of its contract with Praxair and, instead, continued to purchase dry ice pursuant to its previous agreement with Carbonic.

Allen then sued Carbonic, alleging that Carbonic tortiously interfered with its agreement with Praxair. Traditionally, to assert a tortious interference with contract claim, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant's conduct "induce[d] a third party to terminate a contract with the plaintiff unlawfully." Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, there is an additional basis for a tortious interference claim where, rather than induce a third party to breach a contract, the alleged wrongdoer "intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract... between [the plaintiff] and a third person, by preventing the [plaintiff] from performing the contract or causing his performance to be more expensive or burdensome."

No Delaware court had reviewed this theory of tortious interference before, and the court examined opinions from other jurisdictions before holding that it was a valid expansion of the law of tortious interference of contract. In so holding, the court noted that "it seems irrational to recognize a cause of action for a party's conduct directed at a third party designed to prevent that third party from performing a contract with [the plaintiff] and not recognize a similar cause of action for [the plaintiff] where the actor's conduct is instead directed at the [plaintiff] to prevent them (sic) from performing."

Nevertheless, the court held that Allen failed to state a claim under the new theory because the letter that Carbonic sent that formed the basis for Allen's claims was directed to Praxair, not Allen. Moreover, the claim failed because Allen failed to allege that it was prevented from performing the agreement with Praxair or that its performance of that agreement was made more expensive by Carbonic's actions. Nor did Allen allege a breach of contract by Praxair, a requirement to state a claim under the traditional theory of tortious interference. Instead, Allen merely alleged that it was damaged because it continued to accept shipments of dry ice from Carbonic, an allegation that is insufficient to state a claim for tortious interference with contract under any theory. (Allen Family Foods, Inc., v. Capital Carbonic Corp., No. N10C-10-313 (Sup. Ct. Del. Mar. 31, 2011))

Fifth Circuit Holds That Fiduciary Obligations to General Partner Can Extend to Partnership

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a corporate fiduciary who exercises substantial control over a limited partnership managed by a corporation can owe fiduciary obligations to the partnership itself.

David Harwood was a Director and the Chief Operating Officer of B&W Finance Co., Inc., which was the sole general partner of FNFS, Ltd., a limited partnership engaged in consumer lending operations. Mr. Harwood, who managed B&W's daily affairs, exercised substantial control over FNFS, and withdrew more than $800,000 of FNFS funds as personal loans that he allegedly neglected to properly record. The B&W board terminated Mr. Harwood, who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and B&W challenged Mr. Harwood's ability to discharge his debts to FNFS because he accrued this debt through defalcation while acting as a fiduciary.

The bankruptcy court ruled the debts were not dischargeable and Mr. Harwood appealed. He argued that while he owed a duty to B&W as an officer and director, this duty did not transfer to FNFS, the limited partnership managed by B&W. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, ruling that the status of a fiduciary was based on the trust conferred on Mr. Harwood and the control he exercised over FNFS. Accordingly, his debts to the partnership were not dischargeable. (In re Harwood, No. 10–40406, 2011 WL 1239810 (5th Cir. April 5, 2011))

Revision of Earnings Due to Overbilling Supports Fraud Claims

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

Allegations that a medical device manufacturer knowingly overbilled insurance companies and reported these unrecoverable accounts as income were sufficient to support security fraud claims.

According to plaintiffs, Zynex Inc. deliberately overbilled insurance companies and reported this inflated income on its financial statements even though top officers knew that the company would not be able to collect this amount. Zynex announced on April 1, 2009, that it was revising its financial reports for the first three quarters of 2008, telling investors that the reduction in earnings was based on "provider discounts" that should have been recognized during that period. Zynex's stock price dropped 56% following the announcement, and plaintiffs sued the company and two officers for securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Rule 10(b)(5) promulgated thereunder.

The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs' allegations at most showed that accounting mistakes occurred, and that the alleged over-billing did not give rise to a strong inference that the company intended to mislead investors. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado disagreed, holding that the alleged insistence of Zynex officers to continue the practice of overbilling—despite being aware that collection was impossible— demonstrated an intent to deceive. The Court also noted that the amount of the earnings reduction was "substantial," which also supported the federal fraud claims. (Mishkin v. Zynex Inc., Civil Action No. 09–cv–00780–REB–KLM, 2011 WL 1158715 (D. Colo.))

Video Game Company Shareholder Class Action Suit Dismissed

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

Shareholders of The9, Ltd., which operates online video games in China, filed a class action against the company and certain of its current and former officers for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, alleging that defendants fraudulently misrepresented facts relating to the likelihood of renewal of the company's most profitable exclusive license. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead fraud and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs claimed that certain executives made false statements in earnings calls, filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission and press releases regarding the likelihood of renewing an exclusive license to provide and run the networks and servers for the videogame "World of Warcraft" (WoW), which accounted for 90% of the company's revenues. Plaintiffs claimed that the company's executives engaged in a scheme to personally benefit from WoW before the expiration of the WoW license, which was ultimately not renewed, by, among other things, selling their shares of The9 during the class period. However, only one executive sold her shares, under a Rule 10b5-1 plan, and the company's president actually increased his beneficial holdings during the class period.

The court held that plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that defendants personally benefitted from the purported fraud. Because the inference that the company made a concerted effort to renew the license was stronger than the inference supporting scienter, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. (Glaser v. The9, Ltd., 2011 WL 1106713 (S.D.N.Y. March 28, 2011))

MetroPCS Escapes Securities Class Action

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

Shareholders of MetroPCS Communications, Inc., the nation's fifth-largest wireless communications provider, filed a federal securities class action against the company and certain of its officers, alleging that defendants made materially false or misleading statements or omissions regarding the company's future prospects that artificially inflated the value of MetroPCS common stock in violation of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas held that plaintiffs failed to adequately plead fraud and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.

The objectionable statements related to: (1) the accuracy of the 2009 earnings guidance issued at the end of 2008; (2) the strength of MetroPCS's business model in a recessionary economy; (3) the impact of increased competition on the wireless communications business; and (4) the relationship between subscriber growth and attrition, particularly in light of a cell phone promotion that may have attracted disloyal customers who were inclined to leave after the promotion ended. Plaintiffs alleged that certain officers sold their shares prior to announcing adjusted corporate financials for 2009, causing the stock price to fall from $18.85 to $6.01 per share.

The court determined that plaintiffs did not adequately allege a strong inference of scienter. The defendants' sale of shares pursuant to preexisting Rule 10b5-1 trading plans undermined any inference of suspiciousness surrounding the timing or amount of the stock sales. In addition, the claim that the defendants had access to information that the cell phone promotion was increasing the rate of customer attrition, and thereby was not accretive to the company, was not alleged with any particularity as to any individual defendant. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and ordered plaintiffs to reimburse MetroPCS's court costs.
(Hopson v. MetroPCS Communications, Inc., et al., Civil Action No. 3:09-cv-02392 (N.D. Tex. March 25, 2011))

Supreme Court Rejects Statistical Significance as Bright-Line Rule for Materiality

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The U.S. Supreme Court found that allegations of "statistical significance" were not a requirement for pleading materiality in a securities fraud action arising from a pharmaceutical company's alleged failure to disclose reports linking its cold remedy with loss of smell.

Plaintiff-shareholders alleged in the complaint that statements made by defendant Matrixx relating to revenues and product safety were misleading in light of reports that Matrixx had received, but did not disclose, concerning consumers who had lost their sense of smell after using Matrixx's Zicam cold remedy. Matrixx moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things, that plaintiff had failed to plead the elements of a material misstatement.

The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiff had not alleged a statistically significant correlation between the use of Zicam and smell loss so as to make failure to publicly disclose the reports a material omission. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that a materiality determination requires "delicate assessments" of what a "reasonable shareholder" would infer from a given set of facts, and found that the district court had erred by requiring that the plaintiff specifically allege the statistical significance of the reports to establish materiality.

The Supreme Court affirmed. It reasoned that Matrixx's argument relied upon the flawed premise that statistical significance is the only reliable indication of causation. The Court found that medical professionals and researchers do not limit the data they rely on only to statistically significant evidence, and courts frequently permit expert testimony on causation based upon evidence other than statistical significance. On this basis, the Court concluded that in certain cases reasonable investors could view non-statistically significant data as material, and thus no such allegation should be required to plead materiality. (Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 2011 WL 977060 (U.S. March 22, 2011))

District Court Dismisses Complaint for Failure to Adequately Plead Scienter

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

Plaintiff asserted a securities class action complaint against Nextwave Wireless Inc., as well as certain of its officers and directors. The complaint alleged that defendants made 17 statements that were false and misleading to investors over an extended period of time, and that as a result defendants were liable under Rule 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.

The court had dismissed plaintiff's prior complaint and directed plaintiff to file an amended pleading. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that the complaint failed to provide a plain and concise statement of plaintiff's claims as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and because the complaint failed to adequately plead scienter under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.

In granting the motion, the district court criticized plaintiff for including in the complaint large excerpts of defendants' public statements with no indication of what particular statements within those excerpts plaintiff considered false and misleading. The court also found that plaintiff failed to allege how the statements of various confidential witnesses on which plaintiff relied amounted to scienter. The court allowed plaintiff one additional opportunity to amend the complaint, but cautioned that "if the complaint is again a chore to piece together, it will be dismissed with prejudice." (Lifschitz v. Nextwave Wireless Inc., et al., 2011 WL 940918 (S.D. Cal. March 16, 2011))

Second Circuit Affirms Option Backdating Conviction

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently affirmed the conviction of James Treacy, the former Chief Operating Officer and President of Monster Worldwide, Inc., in connection with a conspiracy to backdate stock options. In September 2009, Mr. Treacy was sentenced to 24 months' imprisonment and ordered to pay restitution and forfeiture of over $6 million. Mr. Treacy appealed his sentence arguing, among other things, that (1) the district court abused its discretion in conducting voir dire when it declined to question prospective jurors about their views on corporate America generally, and (2) the district court committed clear error in calculating the forfeiture amount.

Mr. Treacy proposed that the district court ask potential jurors 77 questions, a number of which pertained specifically to the jurors' experiences with, and views of, corporate America. The district court refused to give the jury a written questionnaire or to inquire directly about bias toward corporate executives, instead orally asking each juror about his or her knowledge of stock options generally and experience therewith. On appeal, Mr. Treacy argued that the district court's failure to inquire broadly about juror biases against corporate America, in light of the general animosity in the spring of 2009 towards corporate executives, constituted reversible error. The court was unpersuaded by this argument, noting that a district court may find that warning a jury against an improper bias, which was given by the district court here, may be more effective in some cases than inquiring specifically about that bias.

Mr. Treacy also argued that the district court's forfeiture award was improperly inflated because it was based on the wrong measurement dates for the issuance of the stock options. The Second Circuit rejected Mr. Treacy's argument that the option grant should have been calculated from the date Monster's chief executive made a commitment to grant him the options. The court pointed out that the chief executive, who was a participant in the backdating scheme, did not have the authority to grant the options without the approval of the board's compensation committee. As a result, the date of the chief executive's decision to grant the options was irrelevant, and the court affirmed the district court's decision to use the dates when the options were granted in accordance with Monster's procedures. The court did, however, accept Mr. Treacy's argument that the district court incorrectly decided to assign the same measurement date to all options granted as of a certain date even though the evidence established that the options were granted in rounds. (U.S. v. Treacy, 2011 WL 799781 (2d Cir. March 9, 2011))

Improper Accounting Adjustments Held Insufficient Basis for Securities Fraud Claims

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

A federal district court in California recently dismissed class action securities fraud claims arising out of several improper accounting adjustments made by VeriFone Holdings, Inc. On September 15, 2010, purchasers of VeriFone common stock filed their Third Amended Complaint in a consolidated securities fraud class action against the corporation and certain of its officers and directors. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 by engaging in a scheme to defraud, making false statements, omitting material facts and performing deceptive acts which led to the gross overstatement of operating income and, ultimately, the restatement of VeriFone's financials. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that that plaintiffs did not adequately allege scienter as to each individual or the corporation.

The restatement was necessitated by a series of accounting errors made by Paul Periolat, VeriFone's supply chain controller. In particular, after receiving internal preliminary financial results that were below the company's forecasts, VeriFone's chief executives demanded that management figure out what had happened. In response, Mr. Periolat determined, incorrectly, that the company was not accounting for its inventory properly and made several manual adjustments to the financial results that inflated VeriFone's earnings. Mr. Periolat acted without having the adjustments scrutinized or approved by more senior VeriFone management. Thus, Mr. Periolat manually adjusted the amount of inventory held by a foreign subsidiary, without speaking with the foreign subsidiary's controller and despite knowing that the subsidiary had proper procedures in place for accounting for inventory.

The district court held that Mr. Periolat's faulty accounting adjustments may have been grossly negligent, but did not support a strong inference that Mr. Periolat or VeriFone acted with scienter. Although the court determined that the allegations of scienter were "cogent," it held that other, non-fraudulent inferences were more compelling. In particular, because the adjustments Mr. Periolat made were not concealed in any way and Mr. Periolat's previous projections were accurate, the court determined that the most likely explanation for Mr. Periolat's actions was that he believed his adjustments were correct. (In re VeriFone Holdings, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2011 WL 843959 (N.D.Cal. March 8, 2011))

Delaware Chancery Court Rejects Unsupported Fraudulent Inducement Defense

The Delaware Chancery Court rejected a defendant's fraud in the inducement defense where, at the summary judgment stage, the defendant (a) failed to come forward with specific facts showing that the counterparty knowingly made false statements and (b) did not make a proper showing under Rule 56 as to why additional discovery was warranted.

Plaintiff Corkscrew Mining Ventures, Ltd. sued defendant, Preferred Real Estate Investments, Inc. (PREI), seeking specific performance of an agreement obligating PREI to purchase Corkscrew's remaining 12% interest in a mining quarry business. PREI argued that it was fraudulently induced to enter into that contract because Corkscrew misrepresented facts concerning potential environmental liabilities at the quarry in an earlier but related agreement in which PREI purchased 88% of Corkscrew's interest.

In support of its summary judgment argument, PREI submitted an affidavit from its Vice President asserting that Corkscrew in fact made misrepresentations regarding potential environmental issues at the quarry. The Chancery Court rejected the affidavit as too conclusory because it failed to identify any hazardous substances found at the quarry or any other specific facts that would show a misrepresentation by Corkscrew.

The Chancery Court also declined to allow additional discovery on the ground that the case had been pending for more than a year, and because PREI had not made a proper showing as to why additional discovery should be permitted under Rule 56.

Because PREI had not supported its fraud in the inducement defense, and the agreement was otherwise valid and enforceable, the Chancery Court awarded summary judgment to Corkscrew and ordered specific performance of the contract. (Corkscrew Mining Ventures, Ltd. v. Preferred Real Estate Investments, Inc., C.A. No. 4601-VCP (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 2011))

False Confidential Witness Information Warrants Reconsideration and Dismissal in Securities Class Action

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the court's previous order denying a dismissal motion relied on false information concerning a confidential witness's position and personal knowledge.

Stockholder plaintiffs asserting Securities Exchange Act claims alleged that The Boeing Company made misrepresentations about the testing and delivery schedule for the 787 Dreamliner commercial aircraft. Plaintiffs' complaint relied on allegations by a confidential witness who was alleged to be a Boeing employee with personal knowledge that adverse test results were circulated to senior Boeing executives.

After the dismissal motion was denied, defense counsel learned through an interview that the confidential witness was not a Boeing employee, had no personal knowledge of test results, had never met plaintiffs' counsel prior to being deposed, and was never shown the allegations attributed to him in the complaint.

The court concluded that, under Rule 54(b), it may consider evidence of manifest factual errors for the limited purpose of determining whether orders were procured by fraud, carelessness by counsel, or by the court's own misconception of the facts. The court granted the motion to reconsider and dismiss the complaint because the inaccurate information provided by the confidential witness could have been uncovered through a reasonable investigation by plaintiffs' counsel. (City of Livonia Employees' Retirement System v. The Boeing Company, C.A. No. 09 C 7143 (N. D. Il. Mar. 7, 2011))

Dissatisfied Employees Unable to Recover Penalties from Investors under New York Law

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

A New York statute that requires a corporation's largest investors to guarantee employee wage payments does not require such investors to satisfy penalties owed workers under Indiana law.

Employees of Waste Reduction, Inc. sued the bankrupt company for overdue wages and penalties, as permitted under Indiana law, but were unable to recover their award for penalties because of the former firm's limited assets. Waste Reduction was incorporated in New York, however, which requires the 10 largest shareholders of a corporation to guarantee employee wages and benefits. The employees sued Waste Reduction's largest investors, arguing that New York law requires these investors to satisfy the penalties owed workers under Indiana law. The district court dismissed and appeal followed.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a matter of first impression, affirmed the district court's decision. Plaintiffs' claims improperly combined separate statutory directives, as New York law requires investors to satisfy corporate debts for services performed, while Indiana law imposes penalties for belated payments but does not demand that investors guarantee corporate debts. (Whitely v. Moravec, 2011 WL 523346 (7th Cir. 2011))

Argentine Instrumentality Not the Government's Alter Ego

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

An instrumentality of the Republic of Argentina could not be deemed the government's alter ego based on its role in implementing Argentina's energy policies and thus was not liable for the country's bond debts.

Argentina defaulted on $1.5 billion in bond payments but has few assets in the United States, which has forced creditors to look elsewhere for repayment. Creditor NML Capital, Ltd. sued Energia Argentina S.A. (ENARSA), an instrumentality of the Argentine government that plays a substantial role in enacting Argentina's energy policies but that has independent corporate status under Argentine law. NML argued that ENARSA is an alter ego of the government because the national government owns 96% of ENARSA shares, controls ENARSA regulations via government regulations, and provides ENARSA with substantial financial support through subsidies and other benefits.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed NML's claim, holding that Argentina's use of ENARSA to achieve its policy goals did not constitute the type of close management that constitutes an alter ego relationship and that Argentina's control of ENARSA was not deceitful. The court permitted NML to re-plead if it could show that the Argentine government directed ENARSA's daily operations. (NML Capital, Ltd. v. The Republic of Argentina, 2011 WL 524433 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011))

Manufacturer's Breach of Contract Claims Survive Improper Remedy Demand

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a trial court's dismissal of claims relating to a shipping dispute between a manufacturer and a distributor, holding that plaintiff's selection of an improper remedy in its demand for relief was not fatal to its claims.

Plaintiff, a Chinese manufacturer of organic insulin, entered into an agreement with the defendant, a Minnesota distributor. Under the agreement, the plaintiff was to send four shipments to the defendant. The defendant received and paid for the first shipment, but refused to pay for the second because of mold on its exterior. Plaintiff recalled the third and fourth shipments, and claims and cross-claims were filed. In plaintiff's breach of contract claim, it relied on the fact that all four shipments were delivered as specified in the purchase orders, and that defendant failed to pay for the last three shipments. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that a seller that recalls goods before they reach a buyer may not recover the contract price of retained goods even if there was a breach. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's contract claims relating to shipments three and four.

The Eighth Circuit reversed. Although plaintiff's recall of shipments three and four may preclude recovery of their full contract price, if plaintiff "proves that [defendant] breached the contract as to shipments three and four, it is almost certain to be entitled to some monetary relief." Plaintiff's claims were not subject to dismissal merely because of its initial demand for the full price of the goods at issue. (Dinxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Group LLC, No. 10 Civ. 2612, 2011 WL 536490 (8th Cir. Feb. 17, 2011))

Shareholder Suit Dismissed for Insufficient Scienter Allegations

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a consolidated securities fraud action, holding that the complaint's scienter allegations did not meet the required heightened pleading standards.

Plaintiffs were shareholders in Technical Olympic USA, Inc. (TOUSA), and defendants were TOUSA executive officers. TOUSA entered into a significant joint venture acquisition funded in large part by a $675 million loan. TOUSA provided certain guarantees to the lenders. After the acquisition, TOUSA described the loan as "non-recourse" to TOUSA in Securities and Exchange Commission filings, press releases and analyst conference calls, and did not disclose the guarantees until March of 2006, after it had finalized the loan in August 2005. In November of 2006, TOUSA disclosed demand letters by the lenders under the guarantees. TOUSA's share price plummeted and it subsequently went bankrupt. Litigation followed.

Plaintiffs' securities fraud allegations focused on the characterization of the loan as non-recourse and the delayed disclosure of the guarantees. Affirming the trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, the Eleventh Circuit held that the "amended complaint fails to allege any direct evidence showing defendants acted with the requisite scienter." The complaint included no allegations that the defendants did not reasonably believe the loan to be non-recourse to TOUSA, no allegations that anyone ever questioned the non-recourse nature of the loan, no evidence that the defendants ever read the guarantees or believed more disclosures were required, thought any person at TOUSA was engaged in fraud, or had any other reason to believe the guarantees represented a material risk for TOUSA and its shareholders. Because the complaint rested only on speculative or conclusory allegations of scienter, the Eleventh Circuit found that the lower court properly dismissed the claims. (Durgin, Briclayers & Trowel Trades Intl'l Pension Fund et al. v. Mon et al., No. 09 Civ. 15595, 2011 WL 573483 (11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2011))

Delaware Chancery Court Upholds Airgas's Poison Pill

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The Delaware Chancery Court recently upheld the use of a shareholder rights plan, or “poison pill,” by Airgas, Inc. (Airgas) to ward off a hostile takeover attempt by Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. (Air Products). The Chancellor’s decision came after a lengthy hostile take-over battle waged by Air Products during which it made an all cash tender offer for all outstanding shares of Airgas. Air Products’s initial offer was priced at $60 per share and ultimately was raised to a final offer of $70 per share. Airgas’s board unanimously concluded that the Air Products offer was inadequate, even after Air Products was able to have three of its own nominees elected to the board, and refused to remove its poison pill.

In a lengthy opinion, Chancellor Chandler concluded that the Airgas board’s refusal to remove its poison pill was proper and not in breach of the board members’ fiduciary duties. Chancellor Chandler analyzed the reasonableness of the Airgas’s board decision to keep the pill in place under the heightened standard set by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1985 in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., rejecting Airgas’s argument that the business judgment rule should apply because there was “overwhelming evidence” of the directors’ independence and good faith. Nevertheless, even under the heightened standard set forth in Unocal, which applies because of the “omnipresent specter” that a board may act in its own interests in a takeover situation, Chancellor Chandler concluded that the Airgas board acted reasonably.

Applying the Unocal standard, Chancellor Chandler concluded that Airgas demonstrated that it “had reasonable grounds for believing a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed” and that the steps it took in response to that threat were reasonable. In particular, the court determined that the board acted in good faith in responding to the offers from Air Products. In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed out that the board is comprised primarily of outside directors, including directors nominated by Air Products who ultimately agreed with the decision to keep the pill in place, and that it relied on the advice of several independent financial advisors in determining to reject the offer. Although noting that he believed the Airgas pill had served its legitimate purpose by giving the board time to express its view to stockholders on the merits of the tender offer, Chancellor Chandler held that the board’s determination to reject the offer based solely on its conclusion that it was for an inadequate price was reasonable under current Delaware law. (Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., Civ. Action Nos. 5249-CC, 5256-CC (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2011))

District Court Finds Failure to Disclose All Relevant Information Renders Statements Misleading

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for securities fraud brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The complaint alleged that defendant Sturm Ruger, a company that designs, manufactures, and sells firearms, failed to disclose problems with its transition to a “lean manufacturing” model, and thereby misled plaintiffs into purchasing the company’s stock at an artificially inflated value. After the announcement in late 2006 of its new manufacturing strategy, the company’s share price rose, eventually trading at a high of over $13 per share in March 2007. However, after two positive quarters, sales fell dramatically in the third quarter of 2007, as a result of the company’s inability to produce its products at the necessary rate, and, not surprisingly, the company’s stock price also suffered.

In their complaint, the plaintiffs pointed to a number of statements in the company’s filings that they asserted were materially misleading because they did not reflect the “actual financial position of the company.” The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the allegedly false statements upon which the securities fraud claims are based were not actionable, because the statements were (i) puffery and mere expressions of corporate optimism, (ii) forward-looking statements accompanied by reasonable cautionary language; or (iii) accurate. The district court agreed that a number of the statements were not actionable because they constituted mere puffery or forward-looking statements subject to the safe-harbor provisions in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.

The court concluded, however, that the complaint adequately alleged that several statements concerning the company’s performance were materially misleading because they omitted critical information. Thus, for example, the court concluded that the complaint adequately alleged that the company’s statements concerning the magnitude of its backlog were materially misleading without the additional disclosure that the backlog was due to a slow rate of production, not increased demand for the company’s products. As a result, and because the court also determined that the plaintiffs had adequately alleged scienter, the court denied the motion to dismiss. (In re Sturm, Ruger and Co., No. 3:09-cv-1293, 2011 WL 494753 (D. Conn. Feb. 7, 2011))

Government's Request to Serve Subpoena Duces Tecum on Galleon Granted

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

On October 16, 2009, Raj Rajaratnam was arrested and charged with trading or conspiring to trade in securities on the basis of inside information. Following his arrest, the government served his employer, Galleon Management LP, with three grand jury subpoenas. On December 15, 2009, a grand jury returned an indictment alleging that Mr. Rajaratnam traded or conspired to trade in the securities of nine identified issuers. On February 9, 2010, the grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment alleging that Mr. Rajaratnam conspired to trade in the securities of three additional issuers. By letter dated March 22, 2010, the government identified additional issuers not previously addressed in the Superseding Indictment.

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Securities Fraud Claims Dismissed for Failure to Plead with Particularity

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

Individual plaintiffs residing in Switzerland and France brought suit against four corporate defendants, as well as certain corporate officers thereof, for, among other things, violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. Two of the corporate officers, Jason Beckman and Jason Colodne, moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and failure to plead fraud with particularity pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).

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Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine Unavailable to Plaintiffs Faced with Statute of Limitations Challenge

In an antitrust matter arising under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, despite plaintiffs' argument that the statute of limitations period should be tolled under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed this decision, finding that a plaintiff who neglects to take reasonable measures to uncover the existence of injury is not entitled to the benefit of the fraudulent concealment doctrine.

Plaintiffs, Nog, Inc. and Sorbee International, Ltd., represented a putative class of direct purchasers of Aspartame, an artificial sweetening product. Defendants are producers of Aspartame and entities related to its distribution and supply. Plaintiffs commenced this action on April 25, 2006, alleging that defendants conspired to fix the price of Aspartame between January 1993 and December 2003. Nog, however, had not purchased the sweetener since 1995 and Sorbee's last purchase occurred in 2001. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs' claims were brought outside the four-year statute of limitations applicable to federal antitrust claims. Plaintiffs argued that their delay in bringing this action was attributable to defendants' efforts to fraudulently conceal their anticompetitive behavior.

The Third Circuit stated that even if it was assumed that defendants fraudulently concealed their anticompetitive conduct, there was no evidence to show that plaintiffs exercised the level of due care necessary to toll the limitations period. The court found that in spite of three clear "storm warnings," which should have put plaintiffs on notice that defendants were engaging in price fixing, plaintiffs did nothing. (In re Aspartame Antitrust Litigation, No. 09-1487, 2011 WL 263647 (3d Cir. Jan. 25, 2011))

District Court Grants Leave to Add New Geographic Market to Antitrust Complaint

Plaintiffs, Newmarket Corporation, and defendants, Innospec, Inc., both produce and sell competing chemical fuel additives designed to enhance the performance of gasoline. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants bribed Iraqi and Indonesian government officials to help defendants achieve, maintain and exploit their monopoly of these fuel additives.

Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint, claiming that they should be granted leave to file a second amended complaint to include Iraq as a new, relevant, geographic market. In response, defendants asserted that the proposed amendment would be futile under what is known as the single purchaser doctrine: that a geographic market cannot be defined, for antitrust purposes, to include an area occupied by only a single purchaser. Relying on this doctrine, defendants claimed that plaintiffs' proposed amendment to the market definition would fail to survive a motion to dismiss.

The court ruled that plaintiffs' proposed amendment was not frivolous on its face and granted the motion, stating that there is some disagreement among courts as to the viability and applicability of the single purchaser doctrine. (Newmarket Corp., v. Innospec, Inc., No. 3:10CV503, 2011 WL 250993 (E.D. Va. Jan. 26, 2011))

Mere Failure to Disclose Unfavorable Regulation Is Insufficient to Establish Scienter

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed dismissal of securities fraud claims against a technology company, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the failure to disclose unfavorable regulatory changes in Japan was a result of defendants' wrongful intent.

Waters Corp. manufactures and sells water treatment equipment worldwide, deriving 10% of its revenue from sales in Japan. The Japanese government eased water regulations in March 2007, reducing the demand for Waters' equipment, but company officials did not mention this development during a conference call with investors in October, stating instead that the "softness in Japan" was related to general economic conditions. When Waters missed its 2007 fourth quarter earnings forecast, company officials disclosed the Japanese government's actions and Waters' stock price dropped 20%. Investors sued the company and its directors for securities fraud under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), but their claims were dismissed by the district court.

The First Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that that the failure to disclose the Japanese government's actions did not give rise to a strong inference of scienter as required by the PSLRA. The court ruled that even though company officers knew about the new regulations in March 2007, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the defendants knew the change would have a material impact on the company. Because company officials could have reasonably believed the regulatory changes would not significantly impact worldwide sales during 2007, the failure to disclose the changes did not establish that they acted with the requisite scienter for securities fraud. (City Of Dearborn Heights v. Waters Corp., 2011 WL 167837 (1st Cir. Jan. 20, 2011)).

Class Certification of Fraud Claim Denied

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

A federal district court recently held that a group of aggrieved consumers will not be able to pursue their fraud claims as a class against the company that purportedly deceived them because the company's growing awareness that the customers would not receive their merchandise raised questions of fact requiring individualized adjudication.

Bassett Furniture Industries manufactures furniture that it sells through factory-owned and independent dealers. One independent dealer encountered financial difficulties, and Bassett directed the dealer to conduct a prolonged "liquidation sale," using most of the proceeds to reduce its debt to Bassett rather than to pay to obtain additional furniture from Bassett to deliver to its customers. When the dealer went out of business, a group of 188 customers who did not receive the furniture they ordered sued Bassett for fraud, arguing that the liquidation sale was a Ponzi scheme that Bassett knew would eventually collapse.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin denied class certification for the fraud claims. The court observed—and the plaintiffs conceded—that Bassett's awareness that the liquidation sale would fail changed over time, as Bassett had more confidence that the dealer could bankroll current sales with future purchases at the inception of the sale than it did at the end. Accordingly, the strength of each plaintiff's fraud claim depended on the date that the plaintiff placed the order, raising individualized questions of fact and precluding collective adjudication. Similarly, the court refused to certify a class with respect to breach of contract against Bassett because those claims required an individualized inquiry into the reasonableness of each plaintiff's reliance on the dealer's apparent authority to act on behalf of Bassett. (Schmidt v. Bassett Furniture Industries, 2011 WL 67255 (E.D. Wisc. Jan. 10, 2011)).

Fiduciary Duty Imputation Case Proceeds to Trial

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey denied a motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that the contested issue, whether a conceded breach of fiduciary duty by two individual defendants could be imputed to corporate defendants, should go to trial.

The individual defendants, former employees of the plaintiff corporation, created two entities (the corporate defendants in this suit) without the plaintiff’s knowledge and during their employment. One of the corporate defendants sold equipment at a profit to the plaintiff. One of the individual defendants was responsible for determining what equipment plaintiff purchased from both the corporate defendant and other companies. The other corporate defendant competed with the plaintiff directly.

The court ruled that based on the interactions between the corporate defendants and the plaintiff, the corporate defendants could not owe the plaintiff a fiduciary duty. However, under New Jersey law, the fiduciary duties owing to the plaintiff by the individual defendants could be imputed to the corporate defendants. The court noted that a number of critical facts remained undeveloped, “including whether and how the individual defendants utilized the corporate veil to facilitate the breach of their duties.” Accordingly, because the absence of these facts on the record signaled a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment was precluded. (Vibra-Tech Engineers, Inc. v. Kavalek, No. 08-2646 (NLH), 2011 WL 111417 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2011))

Third Party "Alter Ego" Subpoena Quashed

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada quashed a third party subpoena on a bank because the subpoena was overbroad.

Plaintiffs sued a series of individuals and corporate entities for construction defects, fraud and conspiracy. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants “converted property and misled them through incomplete repairs, non-disclosures, misinformation, inaccurate reserves and an inadequate budget, into purchasing” the subject properties. Plaintiffs later amended their complaint to add allegations that the various defendants were alter egos of each other, and issued a third party subpoena to a bank requesting “any and all banking records” concerning the defendants, including “but not limited to, any and all e-mails, correspondence, etc.”

The court acknowledged that, to establish alter ego liability, plaintiffs can normally review the records of “corporate assets, transactions, management proceedings and other information relevant to piercing the corporate veil.” However, such discovery is still limited to the relevance standard in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that the plaintiffs’ subpoena, by seeking all banking information relating to the defendants, and not just information that might relate to the lawsuit, was overbroad. The court suggested that plaintiffs could depose certain defendants or direct specific interrogatories to them regarding their alter ego claim, which might assist the plaintiffs in creating a more targeted subpoena, and quashed the subpoena. (Copper Sands Home Owners Assoc’n, Inc. v. Copper Sands Realty, LLC, 10 Civ. 00510 (GMN)(LRL), 2011 WL 112146 (D. Nev. Jan. 13, 2011))

Investors' Securities Fraud Claims Against Escrow Company Denied

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

Plaintiffs sued an escrow company for its role in a Ponzi scheme in which, according to a finding of fraud contained in a separate default judgment, non-parties Bradley Holcom and Jose Pinedo stole more than $6.4 million of plaintiffs’ investments. Plaintiffs asserted claims for, among other things, securities fraud under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, and aiding and abetting fraud. Defendant Citizens Title & Trust, Inc. moved to dismiss the securities fraud and aiding and abetting fraud claims, which motion was granted by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California.

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District Court Denies Media Executives Summary Judgment in SEC Action

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

The Securities and Exchange Commission brought an enforcement action against three former executives of a major media company, alleging that the executives improperly reported $1 billion in online advertising revenue. The SEC alleges that, in 10 separate transactions, the media company declined discounts or lower prices for goods, services, or the settlement of disputes, and instead paid inflated prices that were offset, dollar for dollar, by sums ostensibly paid for online advertising (collectively referred to as the “‘round trip’ transactions”). This advertising “revenue” artificially inflated the media company’s revenues for the years 2000 through 2003.

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District Court Grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Securities Fraud Claim

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

A district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claim for securities fraud on the ground that the complaint failed to plead fraud with particularity, as required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).

In September 2009, individual defendants allegedly represented to plaintiff Dupont, then president and chief executive officer of defendant Freight Feeder, that they had obtained investors in one of Freight Feeder’s programs, and that they would need to assume control of Freight Feeder to secure additional venture capital. As a result, Dupont agreed to a buyout agreement pursuant to which he surrendered his interest in, and control of, Freight Feeder in exchange for an up-front payment of $12,000 and monthly payments of $12,000 in each of the 36 months following the closing of the buyout agreement.

Defendants only made three payments to Dupont under the buyout agreement, and after learning from defendant Bridges that Freight Feeder wanted to sell Freight Feeder’s assets and retain its liabilities in an empty corporate shell, plaintiffs brought suit claiming, among other things, securities fraud on the part of defendants in connection with the buyout agreement. Defendants moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that, among other things, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, because the complaint failed to state a cause of action for securities fraud.

In granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court found that, contrary to the pleading standards set forth in the PSLRA, the complaint did not contain any alleged misrepresentations of the defendants that include the time, place and identity of the speaker, or the content of the alleged misrepresentation. The district court also held that the complaint failed to plead scienter with the requisite particularity. (Dupont v. Freight Feeder Aircraft Corp., No. 4:10-CV-239-A, 2010 WL 5093159 (N.D.Tex. Dec. 7. 2010))

District Court Dismisses Antitrust Claim Against Direct Broadcast Satellite Television Provider

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

Plaintiff, a major direct broadcast satellite (DBS) television provider and holder of seven registered trademarks and service marks incorporating the word “DISH,” brought an action against defendants alleging that defendant Dish 1 Up, a retailer of another major DBS provider, operates call centers using a “confusingly similar phone number” to plaintiff’s 1-800 number to mislead and confuse consumers. Defendants pled several counterclaims against plaintiff, alleging that plaintiff improperly secured a trademark on the generic word “DISH,” and that due to this improper and invalid trademark, plaintiff has engaged in predatory and anticompetitive acts, including claiming exclusive common law trademark rights in “vanity” telephone numbers and asserting exclusive trademark rights to marketing phrases containing the generic word “DISH.”

In finding that defendants failed to adequately allege antitrust injury, the district court cited to Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals precedent, holding that in an antitrust action a plaintiff must show that (1) the alleged violation tends to reduce competition in some market and (2) the plaintiff’s injury would result from a decrease in that competition rather than from some other consequence of the defendant’s actions. While plaintiff adequately alleged anti-competitive behavior on the part of defendants, it alleged injury resulting from this anti-competitive behavior in a conclusory fashion, insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. (Dish Network, LLC v. Fun Dish, Inc., No. 1:08 CV 1540, 2010 WL 5230860 (N.D.Ohio Dec. 16, 2010))

Start-Up Company Fails to Recover Profits

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

A federal court in New York recently ruled that a start-up mineral water company had no recourse to the “wrongdoer rule,” which permits a complainant to recover damages in a breach of contract action even if the amount of damages is uncertain, because the company did not have sufficient proof that it suffered any damages at all.

Ho Myung Moolsan, Co. Ltd., a Korean-based seller of mineral water, sought $133 million in lost profits based on an alleged breach of contract by supplier Manitou Mineral Water, Inc.. Before trial, Manitou sought to exclude Moolsan’s expert’s report, on which Moolsan’s claim for lost profits was based, because the report was predicated on speculation regarding Moolsan’s future earnings and did not reference any actual sales data. Moolsan argued that experts are permitted to rely on assumptions when reaching their conclusions and that under New York’s “wrongdoer rule,” Manitou—as the alleged breaching party—had the burden of refuting Moolsan’s estimated losses.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York excluded the report, holding that the report did not meet the demanding evidentiary requirements for new ventures seeking to recover lost profits. The court also held that the burden-shifting provisions of the “wrongdoer rule” did not apply. As the court noted, the “wrongdoer rule” only comes into play when the plaintiff has established the existence of damages, but the specific amount of those damages is uncertain. The rule was not applicable in this case because Moolsan was not merely unable to quantify its damages, but had not established with a high level of certainty that it had suffered any damages at all. (Ho Myung Moolsan, Co. Ltd. v. Manitou Mineral Water, Inc., 2010 WL 4892646 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2010))

Fiduciary Duty Claim Survives Against Non-Officer

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

A federal court in Kentucky recently ruled that a former manager at a medical device manufacturer could be liable for breach of fiduciary duty for planning to start a rival business while working at the company despite not serving as either an officer or director of the firm.

FBK Partners, Inc., a manufacturer of medical tubing, changed ownership and saw two high-ranking employees depart to start a rival business. FBK sued the former employees for breach of fiduciary duty for, among other things, allegedly planning to launch their company while working at FBK and for recruiting other FBK employees.

One of the former employees, who had been a plant manager and machine operator at FBK, sought dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim, arguing that he did not owe FBK any fiduciary duties because he was neither an officer nor director. The U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Kentucky held that while officers and directors are presumed to owe their companies fiduciary duties, other employees can owe fiduciary obligations if sufficient trust or confidence with respect to the particular matter is placed in the employee. To determine if such trust or confidence has been placed in an employee, a court will look to the specific factual circumstances to determine if, for example, the employee had “oversight and control over office operations and access to confidential information” or “acted as a face for the company in public.” Because the specific nature of the former employee’s duties was not clearly established in the record, the court denied the employee’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claim. (FBK Partners, Inc. v. Thomas, 2010 WL 4940056 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 30, 2010))

Commission Siphoning Supports Corporate Veil Piercing

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a bench trial verdict in a breach of contract case, holding that the district court properly “pierced the corporate veil” and imposed liability on a defendant corporation under an “alter ego” theory.

Plaintiffs sued two corporate defendants, Private Label Sourcing, LLC and Second Skin, LLC, for breach of garment contracts, arguing that the two entities were jointly and severally liable as alter egos of one another. The Second Circuit concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court’s conclusion that Second Skin dominated and controlled Private Label. In particular, the district court found that Christine Dente, a co-owner of Private Label and the sole owner of Second Skin, directed that plaintiffs pay commissions to Second Skin that should properly have been paid to Private Label. The court characterized this transfer of commissions as a “siphoning” of funds from Private Label to Second Skin and noted that defendants provided no commercially reasonable explanation. The improper transfer of funds exacerbated Private Label’s insolvency and left that corporation less able to pay damages.

In addition to the improper transfers, the district court concluded that Private Label and Second Skin (1) failed to adhere to corporate formalities, (2) had overlapping owners and other personnel, and (3) shared office space and equipment. The Second Circuit concluded that the totality of the circumstances adequately supported the district court’s imposition of joint and several liability based on corporate veil-piercing. (Alateks Foreign Trade, Ltd. et al., v. Private Label Sourcing, LLC & Second Skin, LLC, No. 09 Civ. 3146, 2010 WL 4923942 (2d. Cir. Dec. 6, 2010))

Tortious Interference Claims Dismissed

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a claim for tortious interference with business relationships where the complaint accused the defendant of tortiously interfering with the very same contract the defendant was accused of breaching.

In early 2009, Geoplast S.p.A., an Italian plastics manufacturer, contracted with I Mark Marketing Services, LLC (IMARK), a U.S. marketing firm, to operate a U.S. Geoplast subsidiary and market Geoplast’s products. Among other things, the original contract granted IMARK exclusive marketing rights to Geoplast’s products in the United States.

In February 2010, Geoplast sent IMARK what IMARK characterized as a “new” contract to sign. IMARK refused to sign the “new” contract, Geoplast stopped paying under the original contract, and the subject litigation ensued.

In addition to breach of contract, IMARK alleged that Geoplast tortiously interfered with IMARK’s business relationships by: (1) soliciting sales from entities in the United States despite IMARK’s exclusive marketing rights, (2) contacting entities that IMARK had cultivated relationships with related to the sale and purchase of Geoplast’s goods, and (3) directly pursuing business opportunities identified by IMARK. The court found that these allegations duplicated IMARK’s claim for breach of contract, and that IMARK could not allege tortious interference with the very contract at issue in the case. Under District of Columbia law, only third parties to a contract may be liable for tortious interference. (I Mark Marketing Services LLC v. Geoplast, S.p.A., No. 10 Civ. 347, 2010 WL 4925293 (D. D.C. Dec. 6, 2010))

Ninth Circuit Holds Assertion of Counterclaim Does Not Waive Improper Venue Defense

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

Investors filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against the former president and CEO of a corporation that no longer had any assets, his wife, and the company’s former securities counsel. Defendants filed answers that included an affirmative defense of improper venue premised on the forum selection clauses in the agreements between the parties. Defendants also filed counterclaims, as well as a third-party complaint against the individual who sold the shares in the corporation to plaintiffs. The district court dismissed the complaint for improper venue based on the forum selection clauses.

On appeal, plaintiffs argued that by filing an answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaims, and a third-party complaint, defendants waived any improper venue defense. Affirming the district court’s decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the mere assertion of a counterclaim will not waive a defense of improper venue that was explicitly asserted in an answer. The court also found that parties may argue alternative positions without waiver. (Hillis v. Heineman, No. 09-17040, 2010 WL 4673675 (9th Cir. Nov. 19, 2010))

Motion to Dismiss Consumer Protection Claims Denied

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

Plaintiffs brought claims against defendant, a satellite digital audio radio service provider (SDARS), alleging that the 2008 merger of defendant’s predecessors created a monopoly in the surviving company and violated federal antitrust laws and various state consumer protection laws, among other things.

The complaint alleges that defendant now controls 100% of the market for SDARS and that there is no economically viable alternative product that is interchangeable with that provided by defendant. The complaint further alleges that the merger was a willful attempt to exert monopolistic control over the SDARS market since the merged companies had been the only SDARS providers, and entry into the SDARS market is prohibitively costly. Plaintiffs assert that defendant’s allegedly monopolistic actions resulted in artificially inflated, noncompetitive prices, thereby harming plaintiffs, who are defendant’s subscribers, and all others similarly situated.

Defendant moved to dismiss the state consumer protection claims, asserting that plaintiffs do not have standing to bring claims under the consumer protection statutes of states in which no plaintiff resides. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the claims should be allowed to go forward until the pending motion on class certification is decided. The court further noted that plaintiffs in a proposed class action commonly bring claims under consumer protection laws of states where they do not reside in order to preserve those claims in anticipation of eventually being joined by class members who do reside in the states for which claims have been asserted. (Blessing v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. 09 Civ. 10035, 2010 WL 4642607 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010))

Unnamed Class Member Could Not Bring Separate Suit for Disgorgement of Attorneys' Fees

Nine months after the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas approved a fee application in the In re Enron class action litigation, plaintiff Michael Brown, an unnamed member of the class, brought a new action in the same court, asserting claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty against Thomas Bilek and his law firm, seeking disgorgement of the $16 million in attorneys’ fees awarded Mr. Bilek for his work in the litigation. In the Enron litigation, pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation and Reform Act (PSLRA), the court had appointed the Regents of the University of California as lead plaintiff. The Regents selected Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach LLP as lead counsel for the class, and the district court approved that selection. Milberg Weiss, whose California office was handling the matter, chose Mr. Bilek and his law firm to serve as local counsel in the Southern District of Texas.

Mr. Brown filed his complaint on behalf of the putative class of shareholders of Enron Corporation who participated in and received monies as a result of the settlement of the class action. Mr. Brown’s complaint alleged that in connection with the fee application in the Enron litigation, Mr. Bilek had provided false and exaggerated information regarding his work on behalf of the class. Mr. Brown asserted that these fraudulent misrepresentations resulted in Mr. Bilek being awarded attorneys’ fees in the inflated amount of more than $16 million, which ultimately reduced the recovery to the class members. Mr. Brown sought disgorgement of the attorneys’ fees Mr. Bilek received.

The district court dismissed Mr. Brown’s complaint and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, ruling that Mr. Brown’s claims were “inextricably woven” into the Enron litigation and could only have been brought by lead plaintiff in that litigation. The court held that “an unnamed class member may not circumvent a PSLRA lead plaintiff’s authority by filing an independent tort lawsuit on behalf of members of the class complaining of acts and omissions that occurred in the context of the PSLRA-governed litigation.” The court went on to note that, assuming the allegations were worth pursuing and the facts on which the claims were based were not known at the time the fees were approved, the claims should have been made by the lead plaintiff in a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment. (Brown v. Bilek, No. 09-20654 (5th Cir. Nov. 12, 2010))

Owner of Pennsylvania Limited Liability Company Liable for Its Debts Under Alter Ego Theory

Kitchin Associates LLC is a Pennsylvania limited liability company that is no longer in business. Richard Kitchin and his son were the members of Kitchin LLC and each held a 50% ownership interest in the entity. In a bankruptcy court proceeding, the Joan I. Glisson Trust asserted a claim against Mr. Kitchin in the amount of $257,047.63, arising from an unsatisfied mortgage loan to Kitchin LLC, the proceeds of which were used to purchase a property in Pennsylvania. Mr. Kitchin was not a party to the loan transaction, but did execute the loan documents in his capacity as a member of Kitchin LLC. The Trust asserted that Mr. Kitchin should be personally liable for Kitchin LLC’s loan, asserting that the corporate veil should be pierced because he directly participated in the company’s torts and because he was subject to personal liability under an alter ego theory.

The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the Trust’s attempt to pierce the corporate veil based on Mr. Kitchin’s alleged participation in the torts of the company failed as a matter of law because the Trust’s claims against Kitchin LLC sounded in contract, not tort. However, applying the equitable remedy of alter ego liability, the court held that the corporate veil should be pierced because the Trust had demonstrated that Mr. Kitchin controlled the company and that injustice would result if the corporate fiction was maintained, the two elements necessary to pierce the corporate veil under Pennsylvania law.

First, the court found that Mr. Kitchin exercised sufficient control over Kitchin LLC to impose alter ego liability because he directed the company to engage in the transactions that depleted the company’s assets. In particular, as confirmed by his son, Mr. Kitchin directed that the company transfer money from Kitchin LLC to pay the debts of another company he controlled. In addition, the court held that the second element necessary for alter ego liability was also present because Mr. Kitchin, “along with his son, disregarded the corporate form and acted as though the assets of Kitchin LLC were theirs to manage and distribute without regard to its creditors.” As a result, it held that the corporate veil could be pierced to hold Mr. Kitchin liable for the debts of the company. (In re Richard R. Kitchin, Jr. and Donna Kitchin, No. 09-17891-MDC (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2010))

Seventh Circuit Vacates Internet Marketer's Lost Profits Award

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated a $5.6 million breach of contract damages award for lost profits because the plaintiff did not establish the prospective earnings of its Internet-based marketing venture with sufficient certainty.

Publications International Ltd. operates an auto guide and a related website that provide price quotes to consumers considering potential automobile purchases. The company originally derived revenue from selling sales leads generated by its website to wholesalers, who in turn sold those leads to individual automobile dealerships. Publications International then decided to sell its sales leads directly to dealerships, and it retained Smart Marketing Corp. to develop and market the direct-sales program. But technical glitches and disappointing sales hampered the project, and after five months Publications International terminated the Smart Marketing agreement. Smart Marketing sued Publications International for breach of contract and obtained a jury award of $5.6 million for lost profits.

Publications International appealed the damages award, arguing that the amount was speculative because the direct-sales program was an unestablished venture and because Smart Marketing had lost money during its brief time in operation. Smart Marketing contended that the relevant market was sufficiently developed, as Publications International had previously sold the same leads through wholesalers, and that its losses were attributable to start-up costs. The Seventh Circuit ruled that prior sales of Internet-generated leads through wholesalers did not demonstrate that the direct-sales program was feasible and that Smart Marketing had failed to establish how successful the venture would have been. The case was remanded for retrial on damages. (Smart Marketing Group Inc. v. Publications Intern. Ltd., 2010 WL 4237443 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2010))

Eleventh Circuit Rejects Developer's Tortious Interference Claim Against Zoning Officer

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a real estate developer’s tortious interference claim against a zoning officer who “re-reviewed” and rejected the developer’s project applications.

Developer Forum Architects LLC, and its partner Isaac Walton Investors, LLC, submitted six project applications to a zoning officer of Yankeetown, Fla. That zoning officer sent a letter to town officials indicating that the applications were in order but did not submit formal certificates of approval. After the first zoning officer resigned, a second Yankeetown zoning officer reviewed the applications and rejected five of them. Forum Architects sued the second officer for tortious interference, alleging that the officer was biased against commercial development and was not authorized to “re-review” the previously approved plans. The district court granted the zoning officer’s summary judgment motion, and Forum Architects appealed.

Forum Architects argued that its allegations raised triable issues of fact regarding the zoning officer’s alleged bias and intentional interference with the firm’s construction contracts. The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the zoning officer was entitled to review any unapproved development applications and that the absence of formal certificates of approval warranted dismissal of the developer’s claim. (Forum Architects LLC v. Jetton, 2010 WL 4358386 (11th Cir. Nov. 4, 2010))

Civil RICO Complaint Based on Alleged Diamond Scheme Dismissed

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act complaint based on a series of investments made with a group of India-based companies.

Plaintiffs made 35 investments with two corporations related to the defendants between May 2007 and March 2009. According to the plaintiffs, the corporate defendants were created to hide money originally stolen from them through a series of sham transactions. Plaintiffs alleged that the companies pretended to purchase diamonds from Indian diamond merchants, reflected in fake invoices, as part of a complicated scheme to legitimize the stolen funds. Plaintiffs included invoices, details about specific wire transfers and a flow chart to support their allegations. The court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations that the diamond sales and related paperwork were “fake” and that the transferred funds were “embezzled” and “converted” were “conclusory” because “[t]hey are simply unsupported statements of plaintiffs’ belief as to the origin of the funds” rather than actual facts supporting their claims. Accordingly, the case was dismissed. (Rajput v. City Trading, LLC et al., 10-Civ.-21654, 2010 WL 4259955 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 25, 2010))

Veil Piercing Allegations Insufficient in Breach of Contract Case

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted a motion to dismiss in a breach of contract and promissory estoppel case, ruling that plaintiff failed to plead the requisite justification for piercing the corporate veil of the defendants.

Plaintiff, TechTarget Inc., provided advertising services pursuant to a contract with one of the defendants, Spark Design, LLC. Spark Design fell behind on payments owing under the contract almost immediately. Thereafter, defendant WW Capital Partners, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant Black Mountain Enterprises, LLC, acquired a controlling interest in Spark Design. After that acquisition, WW Capital made representations to TechTarget that past-due invoices would be paid. WW Capital issued checks to TechTarget, but one check was returned for insufficient funds and another had a stop payment order placed on it. After TechTarget filed suit on the contract, Spark Design filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, staying the proceeding against it, and WW Capital and Black Mountain moved to dismiss. Although TechTarget alleged that the three corporate defendants shared common ownership, that WW Capital and Black Mountain may have exercised pervasive control over Spark, and that business assets were intermingled between the three companies, TechTarget failed to include any allegations of fraudulent or improper use of Spark Design’s corporate form in a manner related to the contract. Accordingly, the court could not find that Spark Design was the alter ego of WW Capital and Black Mountain, and the claims against those entities were dismissed. (TechTarget, Inc. v. Spark Design, LLC, Black Mountain Enterprises, LLC, WW Capital Partners, LLC, No. 10-Civ.-11266 (WGY), 2010 WL 4269602 (D. Mass. Oct. 27, 2010))

Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal in Madoff-Related Investor Action

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York’s dismissal of a complaint brought by Rosenman Family, LLC, an investor with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS), against the trustee of BLMIS’s estate. The complaint alleged that Rosenman was entitled to a return of $10 million it wired to BLMIS, because, Rosenman argued, the funds were stolen or embezzled by BLMIS and thus never became BLMIS’s property and/or part of BLMIS’s bankruptcy estate.

The bankruptcy court dismissed Rosenman’s complaint on the ground that Rosenman was a “customer” under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA). The court found that Rosenman had deposited cash with BLMIS for the purpose of purchasing securities, thereby invoking SIPA. The bankruptcy court concluded that Rosenman’s investment was part of the estate.

The Second Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s finding that the funds were estate property, but rejected as premature its conclusion that Rosenman was a “customer” under SIPA. The Second Circuit reasoned that Rosenman’s phone call with Madoff expressing interest in investing in the BLMIS fund, Rosenman’s wiring of the funds in accordance with that phone call, the confirmation of BLMIS’s purported purchase of securities for Rosenman’s account, and the absence of any objection to that purported trade by Rosenman all demonstrated that Rosenman willingly transferred its money to BLMIS in contemplation of engaging in ongoing business dealings with BLMIS, thereby invoking SIPA, and thus the funds became part of the estate. (Rosenman Family, LLC v. Picard, No. 09-5296-bk, 2010 WL 3911370 (2d Cir. Oct. 7, 2010))

District Court Prohibits Use of Banking Logo

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

Plaintiffs, Puerto Rico-based financial institutions offering commercial banking services, sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting defendant, a Puerto Rico-based nonprofit banking institution that offered services similar to plaintiffs’, from using its current mark and dress.

Plaintiffs used the term “Oriental” in connection with their businesses, services and products for decades; registered various versions of the term with the Puerto Rico Department of State Trademark Registry; and in 2010 applied to both that office and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to register “Oriental” for exclusive use in financial and banking services. Plaintiffs also prominently used the color orange in their advertisements.

Defendant had used the word “Oriental” in its name for a number of years, but in 2009 began using predominantly orange in its advertisements, on its website and on its storefront signs. The term “Oriental” was also made more prominent in defendant’s logo.

The court determined that evidence existed that defendant’s new logo and advertising campaign caused customer confusion and a loss of business, and entered a preliminary injunction against defendant. The court found that plaintiffs suffered an ongoing injury that could not be compensated, and that defendant unfairly benefited from plaintiffs’ advertising efforts. Given the consumer confusion, the court concluded that an injunction preventing defendant from using its current mark and dress was necessary to prevent further harm to plaintiffs and to the public. (Oriental Financial Group, Inc. v. Cooperativa De Ahorro Y Credito Oriental, No. 10-1444, 2010 WL 4117236 (D.P.R. Oct. 20, 2010))

Fact Inquiry Necessary to Determinate Which Sales of Securities Were "By Means Of" Misstatements

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massachusetts recently denied a motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages by investors in Access Cardiosystems, Inc. against one of the defendants, Randall Fincke. The investors had asserted claims against Mr. Fincke under the Massachusetts version of the Uniform Securities Act, Section 410(a)(2) of the Massachusetts General Laws, which creates “civil liability for sales [of securities] by means of fraud or misrepresentation.” Section 410(a)(2) is almost identical to Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and, in reaching its decision, the court relied upon both federal case law as well as case law from other states interpreting the Uniform Securities Act.

In 2009, the court ruled that Mr. Fincke made a material misstatement in a business plan when he stated that Access had been advised by its patent counsel that its product did not infringe on any patents known to counsel without having sought or received any such advice. Following this decision on liability, four of Access’s individual investors moved for summary judgment on the issue of damages, seeking to rescind all of their investment transactions and recover their total investment in the company.

The court found that rescission was not an available remedy because the investors no longer owned the securities and therefore could not tender those securities. However, as the court pointed out, the practical effect of its ruling that the investors could not rescind the transaction was minimal, since the calculation of damages would be based on the amount that would have been “recoverable upon a tender” of the securities. The court held that summary judgment on the issue of damages was inappropriate because there were genuine issues of disputed fact as to which transactions, if any, involved the sale of securities “by means of” the misstatements contained in the business plan. In reaching this conclusion, the court explained that although Section 410(a)(2) does not require a plaintiff to prove reliance or loss causation, the investor must nevertheless prove that each sale of securities for which it seeks damages was made in connection with the misrepresentation. (In re Access Cardiosystems, Inc., 2010 WL 4053614 (Bkrtcy. D. Mass. Oct. 14, 2010))

Attendance at Executive Committee Meetings Insufficient to Satisfy Group Pleading Doctrine

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently granted defendants’ motions to dismiss a consolidated class action asserting claims for securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 brought by shareholders of Celestica, Inc., a Canadian electronics corporation, against the company and its former officers, as well as against Onex Corporation, the largest controlling shareholder of Celestica, and Onex’s CEO (together, the Onex defendants) based on, among other things, the plaintiffs’ failure to plead fraud with the specificity required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants disseminated materially false and misleading statements concerning Celestica’s earnings, profitability and financial future during conference calls and in publicly filed financial documents, thereby artificially inflating Celestica’s stock price to the ultimate detriment of its shareholders. In asserting the allegations of fraud against the Onex defendants, plaintiffs attempted to rely upon the “group pleading doctrine” to avoid application of Rule 9(b)’s requirement that a plaintiff identify the speaker of a purportedly fraudulent statement. The group pleading doctrine allows plaintiffs to attribute misleading statements to the group of defendants who were responsible for creating, reviewing or approving the purportedly false statements prior to their dissemination.

In support of their argument for applying the group pleading doctrine, plaintiffs asserted that the Onex CEO’s regular attendance at executive committee meetings and the Onex defendants’ significant holdings of Celestica securities enabled the Onex defendants to effectively control the company. As a result, the plaintiffs argued that the Onex defendants were sufficiently involved in the everyday business of the company to assume liability for any corporate misstatements. However, the court found these allegations did not establish that the Onex defendants had a “direct day-to-day involvement in Celestica’s business affairs and operations necessary for attribution” of the statements to them. Thus, the court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs failed to allege the direct connection between the Onex defendants and the alleged misstatements necessary for application of the group pleading doctrine. (In re Celestica Inc. Securities Litigation, 1:07-cv-00312 (S.D.N.Y. October 14, 2010))

Chancery Court Approves Hostile Bidder's Bylaw Amendment Advancing Date of Target's Annual Meeting

In the midst of a takeover battle by defendant Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. for control of Airgas, Inc., the Court of Chancery of Delaware upheld a bylaw amendment sponsored by Air Products that moved up the date of Airgas’s upcoming 2011 annual shareholder meeting by approximately nine months, thereby potentially shortening the term to be served by members of Airgas’s staggered board.

Air Products launched a proxy contest to acquire control of Airgas’s board of directors after Airgas rejected multiple merger proposals. Prior to the start of the proxy contest, Airgas had in place multiple takeover defenses, including a nine-member staggered board of three equal classes, with one class up for reelection each year at the annual shareholder meeting.

At Airgas’s September 15 annual shareholder meeting, Air Products’ three nominees were elected to the Airgas board of directors, and the Airgas shareholders approved an Air Products sponsored bylaw amendment that moved the date of Airgas’s 2011 annual meeting up from August/September (when it traditionally had been held) to January. The effect of the bylaw amendment is that the Airgas directors up for election in 2011 will not necessarily serve full three-year terms.

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Second Circuit Affirms Rule 11 Sanctions Award Pursuant to PSLRA

The U.S. District Court for the Second Circuit held that where a plaintiff and his counsel knowingly commenced a securities action in which the only purchase of an actual security occurred 18 years earlier, and failed to disclose that fact in the complaint, Rule 11 sanctions were warranted because the claim was clearly time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

Plaintiff John Libaire, Jr. and his attorney alleged in their complaint that, in addition to plaintiff’s purchase of a single share of common stock 18 years earlier, Mr. Libaire’s 2005 payment of annual dues to defendant North Fork Preserve, Inc. also constituted the purchase of a security. According to plaintiff, this later “purchase” established that his securities fraud claims were not time-barred.

Under Second Circuit law, a transaction may be deemed a security where there has been an investment in a common venture that is premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or management efforts of others. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the payment of annual membership dues could not satisfy the “reasonable expectation of profits” element.
 

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Motion to Dismiss Claims for Infringing Use of Photographs Granted in Part and Denied in Part

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York granted in part and denied in part copyright infringement claims brought by plaintiff, a professional photographer, against a publisher of textbooks and other related educational materials, alleging that defendant exceeded its licenses to use plaintiff’s photographs in its publications.

Defendant entered into several licensing agreements with various photo bureaus. Although defendant contracted with the photo bureaus, plaintiff retained the registered copyright for the photographs. Plaintiff alleged that on numerous occasions defendant exceeded the allowed print run for the photographs under the licensing agreements without first seeking plaintiff’s prior authorization or paying an additional licensing fee.

Defendant moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in connection with one of the photo bureaus, reasoning that the contractual provision in the relevant licensing agreement clearly stated that the photo bureau forgoes its right to sue for copyright infringement until defendant has been invoiced for an unauthorized usage, and failed to pay that amount within ten days of being billed. Plaintiff’s complaint failed to allege that defendant was invoiced for the allegedly unauthorized usage of the photos, and plaintiff’s related infringement claim was accordingly dismissed.

The district court nevertheless denied defendant’s motion to dismiss the claims arising out of the agreements with the other photo bureaus, reasoning that the allegations of the complaint properly stated a cause of action, despite being largely pled upon information and belief. (Wu v. Pearson Education, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 6557, 2010 WL 3791676 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010))

Scienter Inadequately Pled Under the Standard Set Forth in the PSLRA

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed plaintiff’s securities fraud action against a nationwide health care benefits provider, and its officers and directors, in which plaintiff alleged that defendants artificially inflated the price of the stock by making certain false and misleading statements.

Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the defendant health care provider was experiencing system integration and claims processing problems, a growing claims backlog, lack of visibility into claims data, an inability to establish adequate reserves, and problems in adequately pricing products, prior to and during the class period, and that, as a result, certain statements defendants made during this time were false and misleading.

Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the allegations of securities fraud in plaintiff’s amended complaint did not adequately plead scienter under the enhanced pleading standard of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), and that the allegedly false and misleading statements at issue fell within the PSLRA’s safe harbor for forward-looking statements.

The court granted defendants’ motion, finding that the allegations in plaintiff’s amended complaint did not create a strong inference that defendants recklessly disregarded the truth when making the allegedly false statements. The court also found that the statements at issue fell within the PSLRA’s safe harbor, because they were accompanied by meaningful cautionary language and failed to create a strong inference of actual knowledge on the part of defendants. (Wade v. Wellpoint, Inc., 2010 WL 3766324 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2010))

Fifth Circuit Finds That Accurate Reporting of Manipulated Prices Is Not Fraud

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

The Fifth Circuit found that buyers of natural gas did not commit fraud by reporting artificially low sales prices to an industry index in order to reduce market prices.

Plaintiff Rio Grande Royalty Co., Inc. sold natural gas at prices based on those published in an industry index. Defendants, who sold and bought natural gas but were net buyers, strategically sold gas from 2003 through 2005 at below-market prices and reported these sales to the index to suppress published prices. Rio Grande alleged that the defendants were liable for fraud for reporting their artificially low prices to the industry index. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed Rio Grande’s fraud claim, and Rio Grande appealed.

Rio Grande argued that the truthful reporting of transactions tainted by market manipulation can amount to fraud and that failure to disclose this misrepresentation constituted a fraudulent omission of material fact. The Fifth Circuit rejected the argument, holding that defendants reported actual data from the transactions and were not obligated to correct their accurate reports. (Rio Grande Royalty Co., Inc. v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., 2010 WL 3565192 (5th Cir. Sept. 15, 2010))

Expert Opinion of Lost Profits Deemed Unreliable

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

A beverage distributor was precluded from presenting an expert’s assessment of its purportedly lost profits because the expert’s conclusions regarding revenue forgone by the new business were not based on relevant data.

R&R International, Inc., a beverage distributor, accused Manzen, LLC, of breaching the distribution agreement they entered in 2008 and sought $8.1 million in lost profits based on an expert’s report. The expert, a former financial advisor with substantial experience in the beverage industry, had gathered information about R&R’s potential earnings from industry contacts and estimated certain costs based on market averages. The defendants sought to exclude the expert’s report as unreliable.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that plaintiffs generally can recover profits lost by new businesses pursuant to the “yardstick” test, by which statistics from comparable businesses are used to estimate lost profits to “a reasonable certainty.” The district court rejected R&R’s expert’s opinion, holding that a survey of the expert’s contacts, which included results from distributors of alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, was not based on sufficiently comparable businesses because R&R distributed only non-alcoholic drinks. The expert’s estimation of market costs was similarly unsupported by relevant data. The district court also found that other aspects of the expert’s conclusions were unreliable and excluded the expert’s assessment of R&R’s lost profits. (R&R Intern., Inc. v. Manzen, LLC, 2010 WL 3605234 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2010))

Second Circuit Holds That Corporations Cannot Be Sued under Alien Tort Statute

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has ruled that corporations are not subject to liability under “customary international law”, otherwise known as the “law of nations” and that, as such, corporations cannot be held liable under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute. Although he concurred in the result, Judge Leval vigorously disputed the majority’s conclusion on this issue.

Plaintiffs asserted claims against corporate defendants affiliated with the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company for aiding and abetting violations of the law of nations. According to the plaintiffs, Royal Dutch engaged in extensive oil exploration and production in a region of Nigeria since 1958. During this period, a local movement was organized to protest the environmental effects of oil exploration. The plaintiffs alleged that from 1993 to 1994, the Nigerian military, with the assistance of the defendants, organized and executed a brutally violent campaign against the local resistance and asserted claims against the defendants, all of whom were corporations, under the Alien Tort Statute in an action in the Southern District of New York.

Under the Alien Tort Statute, a unique statute passed by the first Congress of the United States in 1789, “district courts have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. Section 1350. The Second Circuit held that in order to determine whether jurisdiction existed under the Alien Tort Statute, the court first had to determine whether corporations were subject to liability under the law of nations. The court, in an extensive opinion, found that while international law recognized individual liability in cases under the law of nations, such as for human rights violations, liability under the law of nations had never been extended to include a corporation. Accordingly, the court held that claims against corporations could not be asserted under the Alien Tort Statute and ruled that dismissal of all claims against the defendants was warranted. (Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nos. 06 Civ. 4800, 06 Civ. 4876, 2010 WL 3611392 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010))

SEC Case Against Mark Cuban Revived

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a lower court ruling that had dismissed the Securities and Exchange Commission’s securities complaint against Mark Cuban. The SEC alleged that Mr. Cuban violated the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as well as Rule 10b-5, by trading stock in Mamma.com based on confidential information he allegedly misappropriated from its chief executive officer.

According to the complaint, Mr. Cuban, a significant minority shareholder in Mamma.com, was contacted by the company’s CEO about a private investment in public equity, or PIPE, offering. The CEO allegedly told him that the information he was going to provide was confidential and must be kept confidential. Mr. Cuban became upset when he heard the offer because he understood that the PIPE offering would dilute his ownership stake in Mamma.com. At the close of the initial call, Mr. Cuban allegedly told Mamma.com’s CEO: “[n]ow I’m screwed. I can’t sell.” Thereafter, the CEO emailed Mr. Cuban, referring him to a representative to provide additional details. Mr. Cuban called the representative and, the Fifth Circuit held, there is a reasonable inference that he obtained the details of the offering, including the prices available to PIPE participants. One minute later, Mr. Cuban contacted his broker and sold his entire position.

Once the PIPE offering was announced, Mamma.com’s share price declined by as much as 39%. By selling when he did, Mr. Cuban saved $750,000. Reading these allegations in a light most favorable to the SEC, as required on a motion to dismiss, the Fifth Circuit determined that the complaint provided a plausible basis to find that the CEO and Mr. Cuban agreed that Mr. Cuban was not to trade on the information he learned about Mamma.com’s PIPE offering. By trading in violation of that agreement, he allegedly misappropriated the confidential information for his own benefit, providing the basis for the SEC’s claims. As a result, the circuit court remanded the case for further proceedings, including discovery, consideration of summary judgment and, if reached, trial. (SEC v. Cuban, No. 09 Civ. 10996, 2010 WL 3633059 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2010))

One day after this opinion was issued, Mr. Cuban prevailed against the SEC with respect to an action under the Freedom of Information Act that he filed to obtain certain documents relating to Mamma.com, as well as other businesses he was affiliated with, at least some of which, according to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, had been improperly withheld. (Cuban v. SEC, No. 09-0996 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2010))

Craigslist Poison Pill and Right of First Refusal Rescinded by Delaware Chancery Court

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

On September 9, the Delaware Court of Chancery issued its decision in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, et al., which arose from a dispute between eBay and craigslist concerning eBay’s decision to compete with craigslist in the online classifieds business while at the same time owning a substantial minority stake in craigslist.

In August 2004, eBay acquired a 28.4% interest in craigslist, becoming one of three shareholders in the privately held company. The terms of eBay’s investment were memorialized in a Shareholders’ Agreement, which set forth: (1) eBay’s confidentiality obligations as a craigslist stockholder; (2) eBay’s right to consent to certain transactions in which craigslist may engage; (3) numerous transfer restrictions on the shares owned by the three craigslist shareholders; (4) eBay’s right to compete with craigslist, subject to certain consequences; and (5) the consequences if eBay chose to compete with craigslist. The Stock Purchase Agreement required eBay to approve a new charter for craigslist which provided for a three-person board of directors to be elected based on cumulative voting. The voting arrangement was such that each of the three shareholders—eBay, Craig Newmark and James Buckmaster—could elect one of three directors.
 

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Chancery Court Denies Dollar Thrifty Stockholder Motion for Preliminary Injunction

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

On September 8, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the consummation of a merger plan, pursuant to which Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. will buy all the shares of rental car competitor Dollar Thrifty Automotive Group, Inc. Under the Hertz merger plan, Hertz will pay $32.80 per share in cash (including a $200 million special dividend that will only be paid in the event of the merger) and 0.6366 shares of Hertz stock for each share of Dollar Thrifty stock. At signing, the merger consideration was valued at $41 per share. Avis Budget Group, Inc. has emerged with a bid a that tops the Hertz bid, offering a combination of cash and stock valued at $46.50 per share. The primary differences between the Hertz bid and the Avis bid are that Avis has refused to promise to pay any reverse termination fee in the event that antitrust approval for an Avis-Dollar Thrifty merger is not obtained, and Avis has not matched the level of divestitures Hertz is willing to make in order to achieve antitrust approval.

Under the principles set forth in Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., when a company is sold in a change of control transaction, a board is charged with the obligation to secure the best value reasonably attainable for its shareholders. Here, the shareholders that brought the injunctive action argued that by failing to take affirmative steps to draw Avis into a bidding contest with Hertz before signing a definitive merger agreement with Hertz, the Dollar Thrifty Board breached its duty to take a reasonable approach to immediate value maximization, as required by Revlon.

In denying the motion, the court found that the Board’s behavior was entirely reasonable and properly motivated. The court noted that the record reflects that “the entire Dollar Thrifty Board had no conflict of interest that gave them a motive to do other than the right thing. The record reveals no preference on the part of the Board for Hertz over Avis or any other acquirer... When directors who are well motivated, have displayed no entrenchment motivation over several years, and who diligently involve themselves in the deal process choose a course of action, this court should be reluctant to second-guess their actions as unreasonable.” (In re Dollar Thrifty Shareholder Litigation, 2010 WL 3503471 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2010))

Plaintiffs Fail to Allege Facts of Purposeful Deceit

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

Allegations that the directors of a technology company inflated the firm’s business prospects and understated its potential liabilities will not support a claim for securities fraud because the plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege that the directors knew these projections were false when made.

Rackable Systems Inc. predicted robust earnings for the fourth quarter of 2006, but fell short of its goal by about five cents per share and announced in 2007 that it would shift its business model to provide more standardized inventory. The price of Rackable’s shares fell 65%, and investors sued Rackable for securities fraud, alleging that the company overstated its business prospects and understated certain liabilities, such as a potential tax payment of about $1.2 million. Rackable moved to dismiss.

The plaintiffs argued that Rackable’s directors knew that their projections were overly optimistic because they had hired an outside auditor to evaluate their business during that period and that the directors should have created a reserve for the potential tax payments. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California rejected these arguments, holding that the plaintiffs had not pleaded sufficient facts to show that the auditor’s findings made the firm’s projections misleading or that the tax liability was improperly disclosed. (In re Rackable Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 09 Civ. 0222(CW), 2010 WL 3447857 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010))

Directors Subject to Personal Liability for Alleged Securities Fraud

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

The principals of a pharmaceutical company could be held personally liable for securities fraud based on allegations that the defendants misled investors and used the firm as an alter ego for their own interests.

Five principals of Immunosyn Corp. allegedly induced two investors to invest $1.025 million in the company by promising that the firm had an exclusive right to sell a “super drug” called SF-1019, and that the investors would receive 102,500 free-trading shares of Immunosyn in exchange. The principals then purportedly sold the drug through other channels and forced the investors to accept restricted stock instead of free-trading shares. The investors sued Immunosyn and its principals, alleging fraudulent inducement and that the defendants were personally liable for any losses because they had commingled their personal and business assets.

The defendants sought dismissal, arguing that the investors had not provided sufficient details about the dates of the underlying misrepresentations and that they had provided only conclusory allegations that Immunosyn was the defendants’ alter ego. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California disagreed, holding that the plaintiffs had identified a discrete timeframe for the misrepresentations of between early 2006 and May of that year, and that they had sufficiently alleged a failure to follow corporate formalities and a failure to segregate personal and business assets. (Albergo v. Immunosyn Corp., No. 09 Civ. 2653(DMS), 2010 WL 3339398 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010))

Stay of Discovery Under PSLRA Does Not Apply During All Motions to Dismiss

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

Plaintiff brought a claim for securities fraud against a medical device corporation and certain employees, officers and board members of the corporation. Several defendants (the moving defendants) filed motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint on February 11, 2009. On September 4, 2009, the motions were granted in part and denied in part.

One defendant, Budimir Drakulic, was not served with the complaint until September 2, 2009. Mr. Drakulic moved to dismiss the complaint on October 8, 2009. In June 2010, while Mr. Drakulic’s motion to dismiss was pending, plaintiff served him, as well as several co-defendants who had made the original motion to dismiss, with requests for production of documents and a notice of deposition. The moving defendants moved to quash the document requests and notice of deposition on the ground that automatic discovery stay provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) remained in effect as to all defendants while Mr. Drakulic’s motion to dismiss was pending.

In support of their motion, the moving defendants argued that the PSLRA was unambiguous and that the automatic discovery stay applied “during the pendency of any motion to dismiss.” The district court rejected the moving defendants’ argument and denied their motion. The court reasoned that while the language of the statute appeared plain on its face, the automatic stay provision did not account for situations where there were multiple defendants making multiple motions to dismiss and was therefore ambiguous. The court pointed out that the purpose of the PSLRA’s automatic stay provision is to minimize expensive discovery in frivolous securities class actions by permitting discovery only after the court had sustained the legal sufficiency of the complaint. The court noted that it had already sustained the legal sufficiency of the primary allegations in the complaint when it ruled on the motions to dismiss by the moving defendants. As a result, the purpose underlying the PSLRA’s stay provision would not be undercut by permitting discovery to proceed against the moving defendants during the pendency of Mr. Drakulic’s motion because that discovery would be needed regardless of the outcome of the motion. (Latham v. Stein, Nos. 6:08-2995-RBH and 6:08-3183-RBH, 2010 WL 3294722 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2010))
 

Fiduciaries Did Not Breach Duty of Prudence by Failing to Divest Investments in Company Shares

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

Plaintiffs, former employees of two energy providers, brought a consolidated class action, alleging that the fiduciaries of the companies’ employee savings plans breached their fiduciary duties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act by maintaining the savings plans’ significant investment in stock of one of the companies, Constellation Energy Group, Inc. Plaintiffs asserted that defendants knew or should have known that the investment was imprudent because Constellation was engaging in risky business practices, such as the trading of large amounts of energy in unregulated markets.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that they did not have the discretion to divest the stock, and thus could not be held accountable for the poor plan performance as a result of the decrease in the stock’s value. Defendants further argued that, in any event, they were entitled as fiduciaries to a presumption that they acted prudently by investing the assets in employer stock. Plaintiffs opposed defendants’ motion to dismiss the breach of prudence claim, arguing (1) that the fiduciaries had discretion to divest the Plans of the Stock, and (2) that Fourth Circuit precedent rejected the presumption of prudence that defendants were seeking.

The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the breach of prudence claim, holding that, even assuming the fiduciaries had the discretion to divest the stock and that no presumption of prudence was warranted, the plaintiffs’ complaint would still fail to state a cause of action because it lacked any allegation concerning the purported events that allegedly should have triggered the duty of divest. The court pointed out that the alleged risky business practices that plaintiffs argued warranted divestiture had been pursued since 2001, with highly profitable results, and that plaintiffs failed to point to any change in Constellation’s practices at the start of the class period. In so holding, the court noted that investment in high-risk companies cannot be deemed to be “prudent when they succeed and imprudent when they fail.” (In re Constellation Energy Group, Inc. Erisa Litigation, No. CCB-08-2662, 2010 WL 3221821 (D. Md. Aug. 13, 2010))

Delaware Rules on Shareholder Access to Corporate Books and Records

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

Shareholder Westland Police & Fire Retirement System brought an action under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporate Law to review the books and records of Axcelis Technologies, Inc., a manufacturer of ion implantation and semi-conductor equipment. In 2008, Sumitomo Heavy Industries, Ltd. (SHI) made an unsolicited proposal to acquire Axcelis for $5.20 per share, later increasing the offer to $6.00 per share. The Axcelis board rejected both offers as inadequate, but agreed to meet with SHI to explore whether the parties could reach an agreement on a transaction. After the parties executed a confidentiality agreement and conducted diligence, SHI requested additional time to consider a further acquisition proposal. Axcelis rejected this request and SHI then put all discussions “on hold.” Axcelis’ share price declined significantly following the “on hold” development.

During the negotiation period, Axcelis held its annual shareholder meeting at which three members of Axcelis’ classified board were up for election. Previously, Axcelis had adopted by board resolution a “plurality plus” rule providing that any director who received a plurality but not a majority of shareholder votes must submit a resignation letter, which the board then could in its discretion either accept or reject. At the 2008 meeting, three directors received less than a majority of votes and submitted their resignation letters. The Axcelis board declined to accept the resignations on the ground that it was not in the company’s best interest to do so at that time.

After SHI put its acquisition effort on hold, Westland submitted a books and records request for the purpose of investigating whether the Axcelis board members breached their fiduciary duties by (a) rejecting the SHI acquisition proposals (a possible Unocal violation), and (b) declining to accept the director resignations submitted pursuant to the plurality plus policy (a possible Blasius violation). The Chancery Court found that investigating possible management wrongdoing was a “proper purpose” for a Section 220 books and records inspection, but that Westland had failed to provide evidence establishing a “credible basis” to infer corporate wrongdoing. Specifically, the Chancery Court found that the mere rejection of an acquisition proposal is not a defensive measure under Unocal and that the plurality plus provision expressly provided the board with discretion to accept or reject any resignations.

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court’s rulings. Notably, however, the Court’s opinion went on to make clear that Westland’s books and records request for information regarding the directors’ resignations would have been appropriate if Westland had argued that its “proper purpose” was to investigate “director suitability” rather than corporate wrongdoing. The Court found that “[w]here, as here, the board confers on itself the power to override an exercised shareholder voting right without prior shareholder approval”, the board must be accountable. Specifically, where stockholders withhold sufficient votes to trigger a corporation’s plurality plus policy, a credible basis to infer director unsuitability is established and shareholders are entitled under Section 220 to the documents and other records that the board relied on in declining to accept the resignations. (City of Westland Police & Fire Retirement System v. Axcelis Technologies, Inc., No. 594,2009 (Del. August 11, 2010))

SEC'S Claims of Fraudulent Kickback Scheme Will Proceed to Trial

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

In a recent case filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the agency asserts that Donald McKelvey, as President of Telco-Technology, Inc., engaged in an illegal kickback scheme involving “sham” consulting agreements. According to the SEC, Mr. McKelvey directed Telco to issue millions of shares of its penny stock to Wall Street Communications, Inc. under cover of Forms S-8 purportedly as compensation for consulting services performed by Howard Scala, the owner of Wall Street. The SEC contends that Mr. Scala never performed any valid consulting services for Telco. Instead, the SEC alleges that Wall Street sold its Telco shares at Mr. Scala’s direction soon after obtaining them from Telco, and then funneled half of the proceeds back to Mr. McKelvey purportedly as compensation for separate consulting services that Mr. McKelvey performed for Mr. Scala’s affiliate through Donalson Capital Partners, a separate entity controlled by Mr. McKelvey.

The SEC moved for summary judgment on its claims against Mr. McKelvey, alleging violations of Sections 5(a), 5(c) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, and Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. Mr. McKelvey likewise moved for summary judgment, arguing: (1) that there was no evidence supporting the SEC’s claims that he and Mr. Scala were involved in an illegal kickback scheme; (2) that the Form S-8 registration statements were proper; and (3) that the consulting arrangements between Mr. Scala and Telco, on the one hand, and Donalson and Mr. Scala, on the other, were valid.

In denying both parties’ respective motions for summary judgment, the court concluded that there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether the Form S-8 stock was issued for an improper purpose. Specifically, the court determined that there are disputed facts regarding whether the Forms S-8 were proper when filed and whether the stock was issued under a proper consultant compensation plan. Mr. McKelvey testified that the stock was issued pursuant to the consulting agreement between Telco and Wall Street and Mr. Scala. However, in the court’s view, a jury could conclude based on all of the relevant facts that a scheme existed whereby Wall Street agreed to sell the Telco shares soon after obtaining them in order to funnel half of the proceeds back to Mr. McKelvey through Donalson. Moreover, the court found that there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether Wall Street was the “alter ego” of Mr. Scala, a finding which would be required in order to permit Telco to issue shares registered under a Form S-8 to Wall Street, a corporate entity, rather than to Mr. Scala directly. (SEC v. Wall Street Communications, Inc., 2010 WL 3189976 (M.D.Fla. Aug. 10, 2010))

Misrepresentation of Lehman Guaranty Supports Securities Claim

Co-authored by Gregory Johnson

An investment company’s representation that certain energy bonds were backed by the State of Georgia—when they were in fact guarantied by Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.—could subject the firm to liability for securities fraud.

Investor Paul Prager contacted FMS Bonds, Inc. in April 2008 to pursue conservative investment opportunities. An FMS advisor recommended that he purchase a recent issue of natural gas bonds, which the advisor described as municipal bonds that were backed by the State of Georgia. The bonds were actually guarantied by Lehman, however, and Mr. Prager lost $112,000 of his $200,000 investment after the investment bank filed for bankruptcy.

Mr. Prager sued FMS for violations of Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. FMS sought dismissal of the securities claims, arguing that Mr. Prager had not alleged particularized facts about how FMS had misled the plaintiff or about Mr. Prager’s reliance on the misstatements. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida rejected these arguments, holding that the allegation that FMS described the bonds as “safe” investments backed by Georgia provided sufficient details about FMS’s alleged deception and about the factual assertions that Mr. Prager relied upon. (Prager v. FMS Bonds, Inc., 2010 WL 2950065 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2010))

Manager's Investment in LLC Not an Investment Contract

Co-authored by Gregory Johnson

The managing partner of a mining venture cannot pursue federal securities claims against his estranged partners because he exerted substantial control over the enterprise.

Marc Nunez formed Sand Specialties and Aggregates, LLC (SSA) with five other partners, four of whom promised to commit $800,000 to the project. Mr. Nunez oversaw certain financial operations of SSA while an operational partner, who was not an investor, handled SSA’s mining activities. When the other four investors failed to contribute their share of the funds, disclosed that they could not fulfill this obligation, and began to utilize SSA property for their own benefit, Mr. Nunez sued them and SSA for securities fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The defendants sought dismissal of the securities claim, arguing that Mr. Nunez’s financial contribution to SSA could not be considered an investment contract because he exercised substantial control over the business. Mr. Nunez contended that he was induced into purchasing an interest in SSA by promises of like contribution, and that his reliance on the expertise of the operational partner showed that he qualified as a passive investor under the Exchange Act. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled that Mr. Nunez’s control over SSA’s finances ensured that he could protect his financial interests in the company, thus his contribution could not be considered an investment contract under federal law. (Nunez v. Robin, 2010 WL 3021618 (E.D. La. July 29, 2010))

Tortious Interference Claim Fails Without Showing of Improper Means

Plaintiff, a distributor of motors and related products to automotive original equipment manufacturers and suppliers throughout the Midwest, brought claims against defendant, a manufacturer with whom plaintiff had a non-exclusive distribution agreement. Plaintiff claimed that defendant’s direct sale to plaintiff’s customers constituted, among other things, tortious interference with plaintiff’s business relationships.

The lower court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Sixth Circuit found that where, as here, defendant had a “legitimate interest, economic or otherwise, in the contract or expectancy sought to be protected, then the plaintiff must show that the defendant employed improper means in seeking to further only his own interests.” Because the distribution agreement did not preclude defendant from making direct sales to plaintiff’s customers, no liability for tortious interference could arise. (Universal Electric Products Co., Inc. v. Emerson Electric Co., 2010 WL 2925930 (6th Cir. July 27, 2010))

Ninth Circuit Addresses "Reckless Scienter" Requirement

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s partial grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, the Securities and Exchange Commission, finding that defendants violated Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 by issuing a fraudulent press release.

The SEC alleged that defendants’ press release, which stated that a new technology system was being “unveiled,” was false because at the time the press release was issued, the company had no prototypes for the system built, or even the money to build one. The district court granted summary judgment for the SEC on this claim.

On appeal, defendants contended that the statement was not issued with “reckless scienter” as required under Section 10(b). The Ninth Circuit held that scienter requires either “deliberate recklessness” or “conscious recklessness” that includes “a subjective inquiry” turning on “the defendant’s actual state of mind,” and that evidence showing that the defendants did not appreciate the gravity of the risk of misleading others is relevant. The court also found that a defendant ordinarily will not be able to defeat summary judgment by the mere denial of subjective knowledge of the risk that a statement could be misleading. Though summary judgment is generally inappropriate when mental state is an issue, a defendant with knowledge of the relevant facts cannot manufacture a genuine issue of material fact by denying what a reasonable person would have known.

Applying this standard, the court found that defendants knew that the company had not produced a complete, field-tested system, and the press release left the “unmistakable impression” that the new system existed. Because no reasonable juror could conclude that defendant was not conscious of the risk that the press release would be misinterpreted, the court held that there was no issue of material fact that the press release was materially misleading and issued with deliberate recklessness. (Securities and Exchange Commission v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 2010 WL 2902393 (9th Cir. July 27, 2010))

Forward-Looking Statements Held Non-Actionable Under Federal Securities Law

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg 

Plaintiff brought claims for federal securities fraud against defendants, alleging that defendants made false and misleading statements in a business plan which contained projections which were presented to prospective investors in a natural gas development. Plaintiff alleged that defendants used the projections to entice investors but never intended to take steps to effectuate the projections. The lower court granted defendants’ judgment as a matter of law after a trial, finding that plaintiff failed to show reliance on any material misrepresentation made by defendants.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. It held that defendants’ business plan contained only forward-looking projections of future performance which generally do not provide a basis for securities fraud. The Fifth Circuit also found that there was no basis to plaintiff’s claim that the defendants knew the projections contained in the business plan were false when made. Instead, the evidence showed that defendants completed the first phase of the business plan and had been diligently working to complete the next stage.

Arkoma Basin Project Limited Partnership v. West Fork Energy Co., LLC, 2010 WL 2711086 (5th Cir. June 29, 2010)

Plaintiff Sufficiently Pled the Existence of a Securities Contract to Survive Motion to Dismiss

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg 

Plaintiff brought claims for securities fraud under Kentucky’s Blue Sky Laws in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, alleging that defendant convinced plaintiff to invest in International Tractor Co. (ITC), a purported supplier of heavy construction equipment. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the investments were in fact part of a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by defendant, and that plaintiff lost substantially all of his $1.6 million investment.

Defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s securities fraud claims on a variety of grounds, including that the agreement by which plaintiff invested in ITC was not a contract for the sale of securities, as is required to state a claim under the Blue Sky Laws. Defendant argued that the "common scheme or enterprise" prong of the test for whether a contract is one for securities was not met because the complaint failed to allege any sharing or pooling of funds of individual investors, and instead alleged that plaintiff’s investment was earmarked for specific purchases and was not combined with the investments of others.

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SEC Enforcement Actions Not Subject to Same Reliance Requirements as Private Actions

Co-authored by Jessica Garrett

A Connecticut federal district court recently denied a motion for summary judgment by an individual, Gary Richetelli, seeking dismissal of claims brought in an enforcement action by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC alleged that Richetelli carried out a fraudulent stock purchase scheme in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by providing several New Haven Savings Bank depositors with the financing to obtain shares of newly-issued stock through the bank’s initial public offering (IPO) in exchange for repayment of the loans in full shortly after the IPO, as well as payment of the majority of the profits from the sale of those shares. The terms of the IPO prohibited such arrangements and each of the depositors executed stock order forms in which they declared under oath that they were “purchasing solely for [their] own account, and there is no agreement or understanding regarding the sale or transfer of the shares or the right to subscribe for the shares.”

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Court Denies Motion for Summary Judgment to Dismiss Aiding and Abetting Claims

Co-authored by Jessica Garrett

The Securities and Exchange Commission recently brought an enforcement action against six former officers and directors of Fischer Imaging Corporation (Fischer), a designer, manufacturer and seller of medical imaging systems used for the diagnosis and screening of diseases. The SEC alleged that the officers and directors engaged in a fraudulent scheme to inflate reports of Fischer's profits by improperly recording income from sales transactions that were not complete. Contrary to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, Fischer recognized income when equipment was shipped to Fischer-controlled warehouses, where the equipment was stored and insured by Fischer for significant periods of time before purchasers were ready to accept delivery (“ship in place sales”).

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Appropriation of Business Plan Supports Unfairness Claims

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

An energy firm may be liable for adopting the business plan of a prospective partner even though the appropriated plan was not unique enough to support a claim under New York’s “submission of an idea” doctrine.

The principals of Sokol Holdings, Inc. sought the rights to develop oil fields in western Kazakhstan and devised a plan to obtain a controlling interest in Emir Oil, LLP, a Kazakh firm licensed to conduct such exploration. Sokol presented this plan, which contained a confidentiality provision, to BMB Munai, Inc., which would provide initial financing under the plan. When BMB later withheld the initial financing and acquired Emir Oil on its own, Sokol sued for breach of contract under New York’s “submission of an idea” doctrine, as well as for unfair competition and unjust enrichment.

BMB sought dismissal, arguing that Sokol’s business plan was not novel enough to support a claim for breach of the confidentiality clause, and that the other claims were predicated on this purported breach. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York agreed that Sokol’s plan lacked the uniqueness required for the breach of contract claim. But the court also ruled that BMB’s appropriation of Sokol’s work supported its claims for unfair competition and unjust enrichment and denied dismissal of those claims. (Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. BMB Munai, Inc., 2010 WL 2605842 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2010))

Former LLC's Senior Trader Can Pursue Federal Securities Claim

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

A former senior employee and member of a limited liability company can pursue his securities fraud claim against the firm and its managing member because his passive investment in the company supported a claim under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Christopher Shirley was a member and senior trader of investment company JED Capital, LLC, and developed several of JED’s trading systems while receiving a share of the profits he generated. JED’s managing member convinced Mr. Shirley to invest $250,000 in the company by promising him that the funds would be used to expand JED’s trading operations. The manager actually funneled funds to his other ventures, according to Mr. Shirley, and Mr. Shirley sued JED and its manager for violating Section 10(b).

The defendants contended that Mr. Shirley was not a passive investor, and thus failed to state a Section 10(b) claim, because he received a portion of JED’s profits as compensation and because he was involved in JED’s daily operations. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois rejected this argument, holding that Mr. Shirley’s inability to control how JED deployed its capital showed that he was sufficiently dependent on the entrepreneurial actions of the manager to support his federal claim. (Shirley v. JED Capital, LLC, 2010 WL 2721855 (N.D.Ill. July 8, 2010))

Parent Corporate Defendants Exposed to Liability in ERISA Suit Under Veil-Piercing Theory

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware denied defendants’ motion to dismiss an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) complaint, ruling among other things that plaintiffs properly alleged facts to reach the corporate parent defendants on a theory of piercing the corporate veil.

Plaintiffs, former employees of two subsidiary companies named as defendants, brought a series of claims alleging that their former employer failed to make payments due under the company’s group severance plan following a period of layoffs. In addition to the subsidiary defendants, plaintiffs also named two corporate parent entities. Plaintiffs made a variety of factual submissions supporting their veil-piercing argument including, for example, that the parent defendants retained a 77% shareholder interest on one of the subsidiaries, that substantial financing, over €500 million (approximately $635 million), was provided to the subsidiary defendants by one of the parent defendants, and that the parents reported the subsidiaries’ earnings on a consolidated basis in some of their own financial statements. Relying on these and other facts provided by the plaintiffs, the court noted that the standard for piercing the corporate veil was reduced in ERISA cases and denied defendants’ motion to dismiss. In so doing, the court found that plaintiffs successfully alleged that the corporate parent and subsidiary defendants were a “single entity” under the alter ego doctrine, and that if the parent defendants did, as alleged, misdirect funds, exercise crippling control and purposefully siphon profits from one subsidiary to prop up another, then plaintiffs successfully alleged a requisite fraud or injustice to pierce the corporate veil. (Blair v. Infineon Tech. A.G., Civ. No. 09-295 (SLR), 2010 WL 2608959 (D.Del. June 29, 2010))

Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Securities Class Action on Materiality and Safe Harbor Grounds

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a district court’s dismissal of a securities fraud class action suit, ruling that defendants’ alleged incomplete disclosures were not material omissions and that the issuer’s earnings projections fell within the statutory safe harbor under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). In the process, the court clarified case law within that circuit on the application of the PSLRA safe harbor provisions.

Cutera, Inc. is a retailer of lasers and other light-based aesthetic systems sold to medical professionals for use in cosmetic procedures. A purported class of shareholder plaintiffs sued based on alleged misrepresentations and omissions concerning an expansion of Cutera’s sales force in 2005 and 2006 to include junior sales executives and a lower-priced laser. The program did not proceed as hoped and was ultimately abandoned. During the program’s rollout, Cutera executives stated in a conference call in January of 2007 that they “wanted to have a more junior sales force focus on a certain segment of the market. We didn’t get the productivity we were looking for with that.” Despite this statement, Cutera projected a significant increase in revenue and its share price spiked. In later statements in April and May, Cutera downgraded its revenue projections, attributed in part to lower productivity levels from its recent sales expansion and “aberrantly high turnover.” The May press release, in particular, noted “the unsuccessful implementation of our junior sales program, unusually high sales employee turnover, and disappointing results from... national accounts.” Cutera’s share price closed after the May release more than 18% off the previous day’s price. The court ruled that despite the fluctuations in share price, there was no material difference between Cutera’s statements in January and its later statements in April and May. Plaintiffs failed to show that a reasonable investor would have received a materially different impression of Cutera’s state of affairs had the company used the April or May language in January.

The court also dismissed plaintiffs’ claims to the extent they relied on misleading revenue projections, finding that Cutera’s projections fell within the statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary disclosures. In so doing, the court clarified that under Ninth Circuit law, the various prongs or separate safe harbors set forth in the PSLRA are independent and should not be read in the conjunctive. The court’s decision is consistent with other circuits in holding that allegations showing a strong inference of actual knowledge cannot overcome safe harbor protection for such forward-looking statements. The court expressly rejected a footnote from one of its prior cases, seized on by plaintiffs and certain trial courts, which suggested that an actual knowledge showing could in fact defeat safe harbor protection for forward-looking statements accompanied by meaningful cautionary disclosures. (In re Cutera Sec. Litig., No. 08-17627, 2010 WL 2595281 (9th. Cir. June 30, 2010))

Commodities Exchange Act Claim Dismissed for Failing to Plead Scienter

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a putative class action brought by a group of natural gas futures and options contract traders under the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA).

Plaintiffs alleged that defendants manipulated the natural gas futures and options prices in violation of the CEA by selling large quantities of natural gas for delivery at one delivery hub, the Houston Ship Channel, in order to depress the price of the natural gas at that hub to an artificial level. The defendants allegedly intended to profit from the difference in price at that hub and the Henry Hub, the hub where delivery was to be made for all natural gas contracts on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX). Plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants’ price manipulation caused the NYMEX price to decrease, resulting in a loss to plaintiffs, who traded futures and options on NYMEX.

Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s securities fraud claim before the district court. In granting the motion to dismiss, the district court reasoned that plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants specifically intended to manipulate the price of natural gas at Henry Hub, as required for a private right of action under the CEA. The plaintiffs argued that they had sufficiently alleged a CEA claim by alleging that the defendants intended to manipulate the price of the underlying commodity, natural gas, knowing that their manipulation would result in a decrease in the price at the Henry Hub and thereby affect the commodity contracts traded on NYMEX. In affirming the district court’s dismissal, the Fifth Circuit rejected plaintiffs’ contention that defendants’ purported knowledge that their actions would ultimately affect prices on the Henry Hub was sufficient to state a claim under the CEA. In so holding, the court noted that the “effect on the Henry Hub, and NYMEX futures contracts, was merely an unintended consequence of the defendants’ manipulative trading” and, as a result, the defendants lacked the requisite specific intent. (Hershey v. Energy Transfer Partners, L.P., No. 09-20651, 2010 WL 2510122 (5th Cir. June 23, 2010))

Whistleblower's Claim Dismissed for Lack of Subjective Belief

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the U.S. Department of Labor’s review of a summary dismissal of a whistleblower complaint filed by petitioner Michael Gale, the Chief Operations Officer and a director of World Securities Group (WSG), the affiliated broker-dealer of World Financial Group (WFG). Gale’s complaint alleges that he was discharged because he (1) provided information and opposed decisions made by company officers relating to waste and misuse of corporate monies that resulted in loss of shareholder equity and (2) raised concerns that the operation of WSG by WFG violated certain Securities and Exchange Commission rules and regulations.

The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) granted WFG’s motion for summary dismissal on the ground that Mr. Gale’s complaint failed to plead that he reasonably believed WFG’s activities were illegal or fraudulent in nature, an essential element in a whistleblower action under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The ALJ found that none of Mr. Gale’s expressed concerns regarding WFG’s activities contained any factual basis for finding that WFG committed illegal or fraudulent acts prohibited by SOX. On appeal, the Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board agreed with the ALJ’s finding that Mr. Gale had not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact that he engaged in activity protected by SOX.

On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Mr. Gale argued that to state a whistleblower claim it is not necessary for an employee to subjectively believe that his employer engaged in unlawful conduct, but rather asserted that it was sufficient for him to voice “sufficient concerns” about his employer’s practices. The Eleventh Circuit rejected Mr. Gale’s arguments and affirmed the dismissal of his claim, reasoning that to be protected by SOX, a whistleblower must reasonably believe that the information he is disclosing to a supervisory authority constitutes a violation of federal laws relating to fraud against shareholders. The court determined that while Mr. Gale had reservations about WFG’s practices, he did not know whether those practices were illegal, relying on the fact that Mr. Gale admitted during his deposition that he did not actually believe that WFG was engaging in illegal or fraudulent activities. (Gale v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 08-14232, 2010 WL 2543138 (11th Cir. 2010))

Securities Brokers Required to Disclose Bonus Commissions

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

Hampton Porter Investment Bankers, LLC, was a registered securities broker-dealer whose owners and top-level managers were found to have engaged in a “pump and dump” scheme. According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, certain publicly traded companies granted Hampton Porter (or its owners) large blocks of free, or deeply discounted, stock. In return, Hampton Porter drove up the price of these thinly traded stocks by pressuring clients into purchasing shares, by discouraging clients from selling shares, and by refusing in some instances to execute clients’ sales orders. In the meantime, Hampton Porter sold its shares at artificially inflated prices.

The government indicted Hampton Porter’s owners, managers and senior brokers, alleging that each participated in a securities fraud conspiracy. Hampton Porter’s owners and managers pleaded guilty, but the senior brokers, including defendants Bryan Laurienti, Curtiss Parker, Donald Samaria, David Montesano, and Michael Losse, pleaded not guilty. The senior brokers conceded that a fraudulent scheme existed but argued that they had not joined the conspiracy. The jury acquitted Mr. Losse, but found the remaining brokers guilty on all counts. The Ninth Circuit affirmed defendants’ convictions but vacated their sentences and remanded for further proceedings due to technical errors in the trial court’s application of applicable sentencing guidelines.

While the Ninth Circuit addressed a number of defenses to the government’s claims, the court’s discussion on the duties of brokers to disclose bonus commissions to their clients is particularly noteworthy.

Count One of the indictment alleged that defendants conspired to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 371, by individually acting, or aiding and abetting an act, in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme in connection with client purchases of “house stocks.” Specifically, the government alleged that Hampton Porter failed to disclose to its customers that company brokers received “bonus commissions” when a client purchased shares of four targeted stocks, referred to by defendants as “house stocks.” These bonus commissions were potentially many times larger than the ordinary commission (which was disclosed to customers) that the brokers would be paid for the sale of “non-house stocks.” Further, the brokers could lose those their bonus commissions if clients sold their “house stocks.”

To prove the conspiracy count, the government had to show that a conspiracy existed, that a particular defendant knew the purposes of the conspiracy and joined the conspiracy, and that some member of the conspiracy (including the owners and managers) performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court found that the undisclosed bonus commissions—even if not independent criminal conduct—were nevertheless sufficient circumstantial evidence of defendants’ agreement to join the conspiracy.

In affirming the convictions, the court held that a broker has a duty to disclose material information about a stock purchase if the broker and client have a fiduciary relationship or a similar relationship of trust and confidence. Notably, the court strongly suggested that it might uphold criminal liability even in the absence of a trust relationship where a defendant fails to disclose material information about bonus commissions (e.g., where, as here, a defendant discloses the ordinary commission applicable to most stocks, but not the bonus commission applicable to four “house stocks”). (U.S. v. Laurienti, 2010 WL 2473573 (C.A.9 (Cal.) June 16, 2010))

Allegations of Corporate "Hijacking" State Fraud Claim Against Corporate Attorney

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently denied defendant Nicolette Loisel’s motion to dismiss a Securities and Exchange Commission complaint against her and four co-defendants, which alleged, among other things, violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)(5), promulgated thereunder.

In its complaint, the Securities and Exchange Commission alleged that Ms. Loisel and co-defendant, Roger Shoss, were part of a “complex securities fraud ring” that carried out a scheme between 2003 and 2007, in which nearly two dozen defunct public corporations were “hijacked.” The scheme included a series of maneuvers to bring void or inactive corporations back into existence, such as changing the corporate names and obtaining new Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP) numbers and ticker symbols for the corporations. The SEC alleged that defendants made fraudulent statements to various secretaries of state, the Nasdaq Corporate Data Operations and the Standard & Poors CUSIP Bureau, and improperly utilized certain exemptions from securities registration requirements. The defendants allegedly caused the “hijacked” corporations to offer and improperly sell unregistered shares into the market.

In moving to dismiss the SEC’s complaint, Ms. Loisel argued that the SEC had not pled its claim of securities fraud with the heightened level of particularity required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires that a complaint (1) specify the statements that the plaintiff contends were fraudulent; (2) identify the speaker; (3) state where and when the statements were made; and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.

The court found that the complaint “amply complies” with the heightened pleading standard required for fraud claims. Specifically, the court found that the following allegations sufficiently particularized the SEC’s fraud charges: (1) Ms. Loisel took part in a fraudulent scheme in which her role included making false and fraudulent statements in Transfer Agent Verification forms, in opinion letters, and in documents sent to the CUSIP Bureau and Nasdaq Reorganization; (2) Ms. Loisel opined that corporations were exempt from registration requirements of the securities laws based on information that she knew to be false; (3) Ms. Loisel sought to change CUSIP identification numbers and stock tickers in order to pass off private corporations as reactivated public corporations in an effort to allow the sale of unregistered stock; and (4) Ms. Loisel knew that a representation in “Rule 504 opinion letters”—that all investors of the relevant securities resided in Texas—was false at the time she made the representation.

The court rejected the argument that the SEC’s allegations were insufficient for failing to identify the date of the alleged misrepresentations, instead finding that the above allegations provided “detailed notice of the charges leveled against [Ms. Loisel].” (S.E.C. v. Boock, 2010 WL 2398915 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2010))

SEC Can Seek Bonuses of "Innocent" CEOs

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

The Securities and Exchange Commission does not have to allege that the chief executive officer (CEO) or the chief financial officer (CFO) of a public company engaged in malfeasance in order for the agency to seek reimbursement to the issuer of bonuses paid to the CEO if wrongful conduct results in a restatement, an Arizona federal court ruled.

The SEC has requested a court order that would direct Maynard Jenkins, former CEO of CSK Auto Corp., to pay back about $4 million in bonuses he received when CSK’s earnings were inflated because of a purported fraud at CSK. Although there were no indications that Mr. Jenkins knew about the fraud, the SEC argued that he was still subject to the reimbursement provisions of Section 304 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which provide that CEOs and CFOs must reimburse incentive pay to the issuer if a company restates its earnings because of “material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct.”

Jenkins sought dismissal of the SEC request, contending that company officials are only subject to SOX clawback provisions if they personally engaged in wrongdoing. The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona disagreed, holding that the plain text of the statute showed that Congress wanted to recover bonuses based on a company’s noncompliance with SOX standards, rather than on the wrongdoing of individual officers. However, the District Court narrowed its holding to the pleadings stage of litigation, explaining that defendants may be able to demonstrate that the application of the SOX clawback provisions would be overly punitive in particular circumstances and thus would run afoul of constitutional requirements. (S.E.C. v. Jenkins, 2010 WL 2347020 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2010))

Terms of Expired Agreement Not Extended by Negotiations

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

Negotiations over the renewal of an expired contract did not extend the terms of the business relationship between the negotiating parties, a Pennsylvania federal court ruled, thus a “limitation of suit” provision in the expired agreement foreclosed the plaintiff’s contract claims.

Storyville Enterprises in 1996 executed a 10-year franchise agreement with tobacco retailer Tinder Box Intl., Ltd., which required either party to bring a claim “arising out of or under [the] agreement” within one year of its accrual. The contract lapsed in October 2006, but neither party was aware of the expiration until four months later. After negotiations to extend the contract faltered, Tinder Box sued Storyville in November 2007 for breach of contract and other tort claims in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

Tinder Box argued that its contract claims were timely because post-expiration negotiations had prolonged the terms of the franchise agreement, based on the general principle that the provisions of an expired contract will govern the business relations between two parties if such relations continue. The District Court held that this principle did not apply because the terms of the contract clearly showed that the parties intended for the agreement to last 10 years and for it only to be altered in writing. Accordingly, all claims predicated on the contract were barred by the limitations provision. (Tinder Box Intern., Ltd. v. Patterson, 2010 WL 2302298 (June 7, 2010))

Receipt of Stock Options Insufficient to Show Continuation of Alleged Conspiracy

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina set aside the convictions of two employees of Medical Manager Corporation for conspiracy to commit mail, wire and securities fraud. In the indictment, the government asserted, among other things, that the defendants had conspired to manipulate the company’s revenue and earnings to fraudulently inflate the market price of its stock and to use the fraudulently inflated stock to facilitate the acquisition of certain target companies. After a jury trial in which the defendants were convicted, the defendants moved to set aside the verdict on the ground that the statute of limitations had started to run when a merger that allegedly resulted from the conspiracy was consummated.

The government argued that the statute of limitations had not run because the conspiracy continued as long as the defendants received benefits from it, pointing to the receipt of stock options by the defendants several years after the merger. The district court rejected the government’s argument, holding that the court “cannot accept the de facto position that but for the conspiracy, defendants would not have received stock options.” In so holding, the court pointed out that the company was successful and that employees who were not alleged to be part of the conspiracy also received options. In addition, the court held that the receipt of the options was not evidence of a continuing conspiracy because the government had not introduced any evidence that the value of the stock options had been inflated as a result of the alleged fraud. (United States v. Kang, Crim. No.: 9:05-CR-00928, 2010 U.S. Dist LEXIS 53003 (D.S.C. May 27, 2010))

Second Circuit Holds That Interpreting Contract as Requiring Exclusivity Would Be Illogical

Co-authored by Brian Schmidt

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has affirmed a district court ruling that held that the “plain meaning” of the contract between AT&T Corporation and KATEL Limited Liability Company with respect to the exchange of telephone calls between the United States and Kyrgyzstan did not require exclusivity.

KATEL sued AT&T for, among other things, breach of contract. The two companies had contracted so that KATEL would build and own the necessary infrastructure for the telecommunications traffic in Kyrgyzstan and AT&T would use it for a fee. Although AT&T used KATEL’s service for several years, it switched to another company in Kyrgyzstan several years after the contract was signed. AT&T subsequently stopped using the other company, choosing instead to send the traffic to a third-party carrier who then took care of the routing.

The case turned on the interplay between two contractual provisions: one section in the parties’ agreement required that all communications traffic from AT&T be routed directly on the AT&T-KATEL circuits, unless the direct circuits could not handle the traffic; the other section permitted each company to enter into “similar service agreements with other parties.” KATEL argued that the first provision gave it the exclusive right to handle all AT&T calls to Kyrgyzstan. The district court rejected KATEL’s argument and the Second Circuit affirmed, ruling that KATEL’s interpretation of the first section could not be reconciled with the other terms in the agreement. As the Second Circuit explained, the contractual provision allowing the parties to enter into “similar service agreements with other parties” is inconsistent with an exclusive dealing arrangement. Thus, although the first provision appeared to give KATEL broad rights, because interpreting that provision broadly in light of the plain meaning of the second provision would lead to an “illogical result,” it could not be accepted. (KATEL Ltd. Liab. Co. v. A.T&T. Corp., No. 09-1575-CV, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 10806 (2d Cir. May 27, 2010))

District Court Denies Motion to Dismiss in Options Backdating Action

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under Sections 14(a), 10(b) and 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and state law violations for insider trading and misappropriation of information.

Plaintiffs, shareholders of Fossil, Inc., sued derivatively on behalf of the corporation, alleging that defendants, current or former directors or officers of the company, backdated stock option grants to themselves, to other top Fossil executives and to Fossil employees. Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants concealed the backdating scheme, and refused to exercise Fossil’s legal rights to compel disgorgement of the wrongly obtained incentive proceeds.

Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ Sections10(b) and 14(a) claims should be dismissed because the complaint failed to meet the heightened pleading requirements set forth in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA). Defendants argued that plaintiffs’ complaint failed to give rise to strong inferences that defendants acted with at least severe recklessness by approving the backdated options, and thus plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead scienter under Section 10(b). The court rejected defendants’ arguments and found that the complaint contained specific and particularized allegations that each individual defendant knew of the backdating of options as well as false and inflated reports of earnings, and sold company stock without disclosing the materially adverse information.

Defendants also contended that the complaint failed to plead facts that created a strong inference that any defendant acted with negligence by failing to disclose the backdating scheme in the company’s proxy solicitations, and that the Section 14(a) claim must be dismissed. The court concluded that the PSLRA standard was satisfied because the complaint alleged that (1) each defendant signed and approved proxy statements falsely representing that options were granted in accordance with shareholder approved plans, and (2) each defendant was negligent in not knowing the correct and omitted material facts that the options were in fact backdated, because each defendant had previously approved granting millions of backdated options. (In re Fossil, Inc., Derivative Litigation, No. 06-cv-1672, 2010 WL 2102327 (N.D. Tex. May 19, 2010))

Claims Concerning Food Packaging Allowed to Proceed

Co-authored by Jonathan Rotenberg

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York allowed plaintiff’s deceptive business practice, false advertising and unjust enrichment claims based on the misleading packaging of a food product to proceed.

Plaintiff’s claims stemmed from plaintiff’s purchase of a box of a food product, Berry Green. Plaintiff alleged that Berry Green lists only its metric weight, and not its weight according to the U.S. Customary or “imperial unit” system. Plaintiff further alleged that Berry Green comes in a non-transparent box that is 6 5/8 inches tall, and that, inside the box, there is a 5 5/8 inches tall jar that is only half-full with the product.

In finding that plaintiff could pursue her deceptive business practices claim, the court concluded that the allegations in the complaint that the Berry Green packaging gives the false impression that consumers bought more than they actually received was sufficient to plead the “materially misleading” element of a deceptive business practices claim. The court found that plaintiff’s allegation that had she understood the true amount of the product she would not have purchased it sufficiently pled that plaintiff was injured as a result of the materially misleading packaging. The district court also denied defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s false advertising claim, because allegations of excessive slack-fill in packaging stated a claim for false advertising. (Waldman v. New Chapter, Inc., No. 09-CV-3514, 2010 WL 2076024 (E.D.N.Y. May 19, 2010))

Motion to Dismiss Lehman-Related Securities Class Action Denied

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

Judge John Koeltl in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York recently denied a motion to dismiss a securities class action arising, in part, from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing.

On July 9, 2008, JA Solar Holdings Co., Ltd., a China-based manufacturer of high-performance solar cells, purchased a $100 million note issued by Lehman Brothers Treasury Co. B.V. (Lehman Treasury), a subsidiary of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (Lehman Brothers). According to the complaint, the note was supposed to have 100% principal protection and was guaranteed by Lehman Brothers.

Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, prior to the note’s maturity date, and Lehman Treasury subsequently failed to pay the note when it came due on October 9, 2008. On November 12, 2008, JA Solar announced that it had recorded a $100 million impairment charge on the value of the note. That day, JA Solar’s stock price declined by 28%.

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Court Imposes Rule 11 Sanctions Pursuant to the PSLRA

Co-authored by Jessica M. Garrett

Three attorneys were recently sanctioned under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). The PSLRA requires, among other things, that at the conclusion of a securities litigation, courts must determine whether the parties complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, if Rule 11 has been violated, impose mandatory sanctions. Further, the PSLRA creates a presumption that an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is the most appropriate sanction.

In general, Rule 11 requires attorneys to certify that information contained in a pleading or other paper is accurate, is supported by evidence and the law, and is not being presented for an improper purpose.

The complaint at issue alleged fraud based on a series of false and misleading statements concerning Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited’s financial results and future performance. The allegations in the original complaint were made upon information and belief, and were based upon plaintiffs’ attorneys’ analysis of publicly available news articles and analyst reports. Following submission of the original complaint, a lead plaintiff for the class was appointed, who subsequently filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint abandoned certain allegations contained in the original complaint and identified new misleading statements.

The court found that the original complaint violated Rule 11 because one paragraph containing material allegations central to the viability of the entire pleading was “utterly lacking in [evidentiary] support.”

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Court Affirms Defamation Damages Based on Comments About Competitor's Prospects

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a damages award levied against an education company that defamed its competitor by making comments about the competitor’s business prospects to potential customers.

The College Network, Inc. (TCN), which sells study guides to nursing students, told about 40 sales agents during a 2006 regional training session that there was no need to worry about smaller competitor Moore Educational Publishers, Inc. (MEP), because that firm was “out of business” or was “going out of business.” A TCN regional director encouraged agents to repeat these statements to potential customers to secure sales. In a subsequent lawsuit, MEP asserted a defamation claim against TCN predicated on the statements, and the jury—among other things—found the statements were defamatory and awarded $49,386 in reputational damages.

TCN appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to award MEP reputational damages. The court rejected TCN’s argument, however, as evidence introduced at trial showed that several of MEP’s potential customers had declined purchases based on their perception that the company was failing, and that a correlation existed between the timing of TCN’s statements and an unexplained drop in MEP’s sales. This evidence sufficiently connected the defamatory statements to reputational harm to MEP and supported the jury’s verdict. (College Network Inc. v. Moore Educational Pub. Inc., 2010 WL 1923763 (5th Cir. May 12, 2010))

Delivery Delays Don't Support Fraud Claim

Co-authored by Gregory C. Johnson

An aircraft seller’s fraud claims against a manufacturer were dismissed after a federal court in Connecticut ruled that the seller did not reasonably rely on a “target” delivery date and caused its own injuries by entering restrictive resale contracts.

Aviamax Aviation Ltd. agreed to purchase an airplane from Bombadier Aerospace Corp. and had also contracted to sell the plane to a third party, who had agreed to accept delivery by any date. After substantial delays, Bombadier, in an amended agreement, committed to a “target date” of August 30, 2008, spurring Aviamax to cancel the original resale contract and execute a more lucrative deal with a prospective customer that hinged on timely delivery. After further delays scuttled this second deal, and a third, Aviamax sued Bombadier for fraud and negligent misrepresentation, asserting that Bombadier lied about its ability to meet the delivery schedule.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed Aviamax’s claims. The court held that the “target date” in the amended agreement, as well as other provisions that governed other possible delays, demonstrated that Aviamax could not reasonably rely on the delivery schedule in the amended contract. Additionally, the court held that Aviamax caused its own injuries by canceling the original “no-deadline” deal and entering the subsequent contracts, which might have been more lucrative but which involved hard deadlines that Aviamax could not reasonably expect to meet. (Aviamax Aviation Ltd. v. Bombardier Aerospace Corp., 2010 WL 1882316 (D. Conn. May 10, 2010))